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Today we shall have come through a period of loose thinking, 
descending morals, an era of selfishness, of individual men and 
women and of whole nations. Blame not government alone for this. 
Blame ourselves in equal share. . .. 
 —President Franklin Delano Roosevelt1 
ABSTRACT 
The current financial crisis resonates with every American, 
regardless of their connection to the securities markets. Many 
struggle to understand how and why the American financial and 
securities markets collapsed last year.  In essence, why did the 
regulators fail to prevent the collapse?  Government officials 
continue to analyze the relationship between the structural collapse 
of the markets and regulators’ limited jurisdiction over a class of 
entities whose transactions substantially impact the markets: hedge 
funds.  Congress can no longer deny hedge funds’ detrimental 
impact on the financial and securities markets.  The impetus for 
financial re-regulation has arrived. It is incumbent upon Congress to 
enact laws which extend the jurisdiction of federal regulators to 
hedge funds.  At a minimum, such supervision is necessary to protect 
the investing public. 
The elusiveness of hedge funds and their investment strategies is of 
particular concern.  Federal regulation may take the form of a 
registration requirement.  Perhaps publicly-traded companies should 
disclose their transactions with hedge funds. More comprehensive 
regulatory reform options include the creation of a hybrid regulatory 
hedge fund governance matrix based upon the dollar volume, 
frequency of trades and potential losses that hedge funds may 
experience. It is incumbent upon Congress to create the proper 
balance between protecting the investing public and maintaining 
sustainable American financial and securities markets, which in turn 
stabilizes the global economy. 
 1. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Roosevelt’s Nomination Address, Chicago, III. (July 2, 
1932) (transcript available at http://newdeal.feri.org/speeches/1932b.htm) [hereinafter 
Roosevelt Address]. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 He that is of opinion money will do everything may well be suspected of doing 
everything for money. 
—Benjamin Franklin2 
The red light on my office phone flashed incessantly, demanding 
attention.  I ignored it. My small, government issued office, courtesy of 
New York State Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, would seem to the 
casual observer the epitome of efficiency; no space was left unused.  
Each square inch of the office had documents appropriately labeled, 
categorized, read and re-read.  Ah, the duty to read. The fiduciary duty 
to read, established by the court in Francis v. New Jersey Bank,3 
remained with me years after my corporations class. I read and re-read 
everything. 
My attention was pulled back to the flashing red light on my phone.  
I wondered if that strange woman who kept leaving me all those bizarre 
messages about mutual funds, late trading, capacity, hedge funds and 
market timing had called again.  She had left at least three messages all 
in rapid fire, exacting phrases like, “you should look into mutual funds 
and hedge funds late trading stocks. What they are doing is illegal!”4  
She left no explanation and certainly not her name. More importantly, 
she did not indicate how she knew about the alleged fraud. But there was 
something about her tone that got my attention and piqued my interest. I 
brought her phone calls to the attention of Roger Waldman, my 
immediate supervisor.5  I wanted to find out if he knew anything about 
 2. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD’S ALMANACK 27 (U.S.C. Publ’g Co. 
1914). 
 3. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (N.J. 1981) (holding that 
“[d]irectors are under a continuing obligation to keep informed about the activities of 
the corporation.  Otherwise, they may not be able to participate in the overall 
management of corporate affairs.” (citing Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 
1924))).  Id. at 822 (“Directors may not shut their eyes to corporate misconduct and 
then claim that because they did not see the misconduct, they did not have a duty to 
look. The sentinel asleep at his post contributes nothing to the enterprise he is charged 
to protect.” (citing Wilkinson v. Dodd, 42 N.J. Eq. 234, 245 (N.J. Ch. 1886))). 
 4. See BROOKE MASTERS, SPOILING FOR A FIGHT—THE RISE OF ELIOT SPITZER 
135 (Times Books 2006). 
 5. See Press Release, Office of the New York State Attorney General, Robertson 
Stevenson Settles Market Timing Case (Oct. 6, 2004), available at http://www.oag. 
state.ny.us/media_center/2004/oct/oct6b_04.html. 
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terms such as capacity, timing, and late trading, which I may have 
missed during my own corporate transactional days on Wall Street, from 
his days at Sullivan & Cromwell. He knew nothing.  I could tell because 
he had no reaction when I mentioned mutual funds and late trading. I 
also shared the curious messages from the strange woman with Bureau 
Chief, Eric Dinallo.6 I received permission to offer her transactional 
immunity and to have her come to the New York State Attorney 
General’s Office to be queen for the day and share her story. All I had to 
do was find her, convince her to testify, and turn state’s witness—
because it was her civic duty. 
For the next four days, I spent every spare moment in my office 
awaiting the proverbial phone to ring and astutely avoided calls from 
reporters, lawyers and persons of interest.  At last, the phone rang in its 
usual trill manner; I answered it half expecting a reporter or security 
guard informing me that my afternoon appointment had arrived.  It was 
neither.  “I’m that woman who has been calling you,” a very polished 
voice stated.  “I’m glad you called,” I replied with a mixture of relief 
and elation in my voice.  “I would like to help in any way that I can.  
Tell me what’s going on that has so disturbed you that you felt 
compelled to contact me.”  It took forty-five minutes to transcribe what 
was either one of the biggest frauds in corporate history or the biggest 
piece of nonsense that ever came to my attention.  Where the truth laid 
would take months of detailed investigation, depositions, outright threats 
and negotiated settlements to uncover.  Through it all, the unfailing 
courage of Noreen Harrington,7 a woman willing to risk everything to 
help the American investing public, would be challenged again and 
again. 
 6. See Profile of Eric R. Dinallo, Henry Kaufman Visiting Professor of Finance at 
New York University’s Leonard N. Stern School of Business, http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/ 
faculty/facultyindex.cgi?id=554 (last visited Nov. 2, 2009) (profiling Dinallo and 
highlighting his service as 39th Superintendent of the New York State Insurance 
Department). 
 7. Noreen Harrington, a respected 20-year Wall Street veteran, exposed the worst 
scandal in mutual fund history. See Rebecca Leung, Meet a Major-League 
Whistleblower:  Woman Who Exposed Mutual Fund Scandal Talks to 60 Minutes II, 
CBS NEWS, July 7, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/02/17/60II/main 
600649.shtml.  She was the whistleblower who revealed the misconduct in the recent 
mutual fund scandals. Id.  Her efforts, along with the Office of New York Attorney 
General Eliot Spitzer, led to the end of late trading and market timing abuses, and 
created industry reforms that benefit and protect an estimated 95 million investors. Id. 
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The mutual fund fraud investigation focused on mutual fund 
companies and their corresponding boards who prevented investors from 
realizing the increased growth of particular mutual funds by 
inappropriately permitting hedge funds to engage in activities such as 
market timing8 and late trading.9  These fraudulent practices allowed 
hedge funds to remove the unrealized profits from the mutual funds 
before the mutual funds could recognize the gain for the benefit of the 
investors in the mutual fund.  Canary Capital, LLC was one of the few 
hedge funds to reach a settlement with New York State Attorney 
General Eliot Spitzer or the SEC, although dozens of hedge funds were 
investigated by both regulatory agencies.  Despite the questionable 
conduct engaged in by dozens of investigated hedge funds, their conduct 
was not per se illegal because it did not violate any specific federal or 
state securities laws that applied to hedge funds. Ultimately, the 
investigation resulted in a series of unprecedented agreements between 
regulators—the Office of New York State Attorney General, Eliot 
Spitzer, and the Securities & Exchange Commission10—and financial 
 8. Market timing is defined as “[t]he purchase and sale of securities based on 
short-term price patterns as well as on asset values.”  TheFreeDictionary.com, Market 
Timing, http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/market+timing (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2009).  “Some analysts use fundamental analysis to select the securities to 
purchase or sell; then they rely on market timing to decide when to trade those 
securities.” Id. 
 9. Late trading is defined as the “[i]llegal practice of obtaining the next day’s net 
asset value (NAV) of a mutual fund’s shares and using this information to buy or sell 
those shares at the previous day’s prices.” InvestorWords.com, Late Trading, 
http://www.investorwords.com/7371/late_trading.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2009). 
As mutual funds usually compute the NAV at the close of a trading day (4:00 p.m. 
Eastern Time) for the next day’s trades, a trader placing a buy or sell order after the 
closing time can still get that day’s prices and can gain an unfair advantage over other 
traders. According to the SEC, “Late trading violates the federal securities laws . . . 
and defrauds innocent investors.” Late trading, however, is not the same as after-hours 
trading which is a legal practice. 
Id. 
 10. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is a federal regulatory agency 
that has jurisdiction over the U.S. securities market.  See SEC, The Investor’s Advocate: 
How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilities Capital 
Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Oct. 7, 2009) 
[hereinafter Investor’s Advocate].  Congress established the SEC in 1934 to enforce the 
newly adopted 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Exchange Act, to promote stability in 
the markets and, most importantly, to protect investors.  Id.  See also 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) 
(2006) (establishing the SEC); 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006) (setting out the rationale for the 
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firms.11  The 2004 settlements resulted in payments of approximately $2 
billion.  They also required numerous structural changes in mutual fund 
regulation, such as changes to mutual fund fee calculation, board 
structure and disclosure to investors.  Hedge funds emerged from the 
mutual fund fraud investigation unscathed; the industry was not subject 
to any new regulatory oversight. 
Few, if any, federal or state securities laws apply to hedge funds.  
This lack of regulation makes it nearly impossible for the government or 
investors to these pools of capital accountable for any questionable 
conduct in the securities and financial markets.  During the last decade, 
the rapid growth of the hedge fund industry—evidenced by increases in 
metrics such as assets under management, volume of trading, frequency 
of transactions and the scope of the firms’ activities—has given 
regulators and the investing public cause for concern.  Important 
questions remain unanswered: most importantly, what should be done 
when hedge funds employ manipulative schemes which enrich hedge 
funds at the expense of the integrity, stability and soundness of the 
financial system? 
For example, imagine a hedge fund has slowly accumulated a 
sizable amount of credit default swaps (“CDS”), which require the CDS 
issuer to compensate the CDS purchaser in the event a company whose 
credit risk is insured by the swap (‘target’) cannot repay its debts.12  The 
fund’s purchases put upward pressure on the price of these swaps, a 
development which is perceived by the market as a reflection of 
SEC and regulation of securities markets).  The SEC describes its function as promoting 
and facilitating investor access to essential investment related information by 
“promoting the disclosure of important market-related information, maintaining fair 
dealing, and protecting against fraud.”  Investor’s Advocate, supra. 
 11. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the New York State Attorney General, 
Spitzer, S.E.C. Reach Largest Mutual Fund Settlement Ever (Mar. 15, 2004), available 
at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2004/mar/mar15c_04.html. 
 12. InvestorWords.com, Credit Default Swap, http://www.investorwords.com/ 
5876/credit_default_swap.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2009). 
A specific kind of counterparty agreement which allows the transfer of third party 
credit risk from one party to the other. One party in the swap is a lender and faces 
credit risk from a third party, and the counterparty in the credit default swap agrees to 
insure this risk in exchange of regular periodic payments (essentially an insurance 
premium). If the third party defaults, the party providing insurance will have to 
purchase from the insured party the defaulted asset. In turn, the insurer pays the 
insured the remaining interest on the debt, as well as the principal. 
Id. 
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investors’ concerns about the target’s ability to meet its financial 
obligations.  If the hedge fund were to publish and widely disseminate a 
negative research report about the target company, whose securities are 
subject to the fund’s substantial ‘short position,’13 then the price of the 
target’s equity is likely to decline and the cost of CDS payable in the 
event of the target’s default14 would rise. The hedge fund could then 
capitalize on these developments and sell into a market reacting to the 
fund’s report. The hedge fund’s profits would come at the expense of the 
target’s shareholders, creditors,15 employees and business partners.16 
A more striking example is when a hedge fund trades the mutual 
fund’s shares after the close of the market.  Due to technological 
advances, these late trades appear to be a routine part of the mutual 
fund’s after hours clearing process.17 Late trading in mutual fund shares 
should be deemed illegal.  These activities are barely within the 
periphery of legitimate transactions on behalf of the mutual fund’s long-
term investors. Unfortunately, the drafters of current federal and state 
securities laws did not envision this type of schemes. 
These hedge fund investment schemes detrimentally impact the 
investing public both financially and psychologically.  The value of 
assets held by traditional investors is impaired as the schemes 
unjustifiably siphon long-term investors’ unrealized profits. Perhaps 
more importantly, such schemes call into question the integrity of the 
markets and diminish the markets’ appeal for many investors.  Such 
dubious hedge fund activities are cause for concern about the lack of 
 13. InvestorWords.com, Short Position, http://www.investorwords.com/4554/ 
short_position.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2009).  A short position is defined in two ways:  
a futures contract where there is “the promise to sell a certain quantity of a good at a 
particular price in the future” and as “[selling] a stock short.”  Id. 
 14. Products with the characteristics of a CDS might otherwise be called 
“protection” or “insurance.” Here, however, the hedge fund has no underlying credit 
exposure to the target. The fund’s investment in the CDS is purely speculative. Under 
such circumstances, a CDS is neither insurance, nor protection; it is just a bet. 
 15. The target’s creditors include holders of its publicly-traded debt, which would 
presumably fall in value as the market reacts to the price of CDS involving the target. 
 16. As the target’s equities and bonds decline in value, the target will find it more 
costly to make acquisitions or borrow. These developments will impede any new 
investment, expansion, or hiring by the target company. 
 17. See Bloomberg News, 2 Sued on Trading Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2005, 
at C4.  The SEC filed a complaint against two hedge funds who allegedly “took 
advantage of a Bear Sterns system that allowed them to buy or sell mutual fund shares 
after a 4 p.m. regulatory cutoff.” Id. 
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hedge fund regulation.  The current financial crisis makes Congressional 
action to address the lack of hedge fund regulation imperative. 
This Article offers an alternative legal and factual framework to 
monitor and regulate hedge fund activity.  Its proposed solutions could 
be adopted by state, federal and international regulators.  After exam-
ining the policy arguments commonly advanced by opponents of hedge 
fund regulation, this Article concludes that public good principles 
strongly support comprehensive hedge fund regulation based on a hybrid 
hedge fund governance matrix. 
The foundation for this Article’s conclusion is the principle of 
‘public good.’  Part I discusses the historical development of the 
American public good concept and, in particular, its application to early 
corporations.  Rampant fraud led state governments to assume respon-
sibility for protecting the investing public and adopt anti-fraud 
provisions in state securities laws.  New York State’s Martin Act is a 
prominent example of such state regulation.18  The federal government, 
pressured by the states, responded with comprehensive anti-fraud 
regulation and disclosure requirements. 
Hedge funds are a recent and confusing phenomenon.  Part II 
discusses the historical development of hedge funds, including their 
exemptions from federal securities regulation. In particular, the industry 
 18. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352 (McKinney 2009).  “There is also an ongoing 
debate whether the consumer fraud provisions of the General Business Law [Section] 
349, extend to securities transactions. New York is one of the few states which have not 
adopted the Uniform Securities Act. . . .” Robert A. McTamaney, New York’s Martin 
Act:  Expanding Enforcement in an Era of Federal Securities Regulation, 18 LEGAL 
BACKGROUNDER 1 n.1 (2003).  New York State’s “securities laws were left largely in 
place when the series of federal securities laws were passed in the 1930s and 1940s.” Id. 
at 2.  “The Martin Act really became a sleeping giant in 1955, with the addition of 
criminal penalties.” See id. These are unique remedies which few other state securities 
laws possess especially when “coupled with the [Martin Act’s] broad ‘fraud’ 
provisions,” which can be triggered without the necessity of proving intent, also known 
as scienter.  Id.  Scienter is “the willful and knowing commission of an illegal act, 
without proof of intent to defraud.” Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).  “In 1986, intentional 
violations were made felonies.” Id. at 3.  “[T]he Martin Act arguably is hardly a fraud 
statute at all, but rather is specifies virtually per se criminal and civil liability” if the 
prohibited conduct occurs. Id. at 3.  An interesting “absence is any provision for civil 
damage suits by individuals, and the courts have consistently refused to imply one.” Id.  
Additionally, the Martin Act provides broad administrative discovery and subpoena 
power and ex parte injunctive relied are all permitted and available to the Attorney 
General’s Office. Id. 
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is exempt from the public offering registration requirements of the 
Securities Act of 1933,19 the periodic reporting obligations of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,20 the registration requirements of the 
Investment Company Act of 194021 and the registration requirements of 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.22 
Part III discusses federal regulators’ concerns about hedge funds, 
including the public’s increasing exposure to hedge funds vis-à-vis 
public pension funds.  Part III also examines the SEC’s failed attempt to 
regulate hedge funds. 
This theoretical, historical and legislative backdrop belies the hedge 
fund industry’s pervasive lack of disclosure and reliance on 
objectionable investment strategies such as short selling, credit default 
swaps and the use of excessive leverage. Part IV examines such 
practices.  Part V continues with an examination of manipulative hedge 
fund activities such as late trading, marketing timing and publication of 
negative research reports. 
This Article makes a compelling case for new regulation. Part VI 
outlines an alternative approach to hedge fund regulation based on a 
four-prong hybrid hedge fund governance matrix. 
Finally, the Article concludes the public interest in the viability of 
the financial and securities markets and the economic stability of global 
economies is advanced by comprehensive hedge fund regulation. 
 19. Securities Act of 1933 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g(2) (2006); Philip A. Loomis, Jr., 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisor’s Act of 1940, 28 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 214, 215 (1959) (“The [Securities Act] deals principally with 
distribution of new issues . . . .”). 
 20. Loomis, supra note 19, at 214 (“The [Securities Exchange Act] superimposes a 
rather complex regulatory structure upon the intricate and sensitive mechanism of the 
securities market.”); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006). 
 21. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to 80a-b4  (2006). 
 22. Loomis, supra note 19, at 214 (“The [Investment Advisors Act] by contrast is a 
rather simple statute touching on a few aspects of a field not yet completely explored.”); 
Investment Advisors Act of 1940 §§ 201-22, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-22 (2006). 
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I.  ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC GOOD CONCEPT 
No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far 
greater part of the members are poor and miserable. 
—Adam Smith23 
In the mid-1800s, Alexis de Tocqueville left France to travel 
through the young American republic, and he made an interesting 
discovery.  He observed Americans’ concept of public good was 
grounded in the belief that “[t]he personal advantage of each member of 
the community may result in working for the good of all.”24 Such an 
outlook did not specifically require virtue or institutions to per se reward 
cooperation for the public good. In fact, those who declined to cooperate 
for the public good were not punished. The structure of the American 
public good concept, in Tocqueville’s view, was analytically incoherent. 
It offered no reason to believe an individual, motivated by self-interest, 
would come to adopt cooperative behavior as a voluntary selection for 
the public’s good. Opportunities to free ride on the cooperative behavior 
of others exist simply by virtue of community membership. While this 
seemed especially strange to Tocqueville, he found Americans were 
convinced it was in their interest to be virtuous.25 
A.  Application of Public Good to Early American Corporations 
Corporations are such an integral part of American culture that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a time when they did not exist. 
The historical development of American corporate law is rooted in 
economic, military, and political forces. Early American corporations 
were established primarily to allow private resources to accomplish 
public functions that government was unable to finance, such as the 
 
 23. I ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY TO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 70 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1914) (1910). 
 24. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 500 (Henry Reeve & Delba 
Winthrop trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2000) (1835).  The conflict between private 
and public good had become congruent for most Americans—that is to say, “self 
interest well understood” became “the interest of each to be honest.” Tocqueville 
described the concept of “self interest well understood” in the quoted language above.  
Id. 
 25. Id. at 501. 
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creation of canals, railroads, bridges, tunnels, and highways.26  Initially, 
corporations were largely creatures of the state government, borne of 
legislative charter and limited in duration.27 Once a corporation achieved 
its purpose, such as the completion of a bridge, it ceased to exist.  As the 
American economy expanded, popular acceptance of corporations as a 
means of facilitating public work projects grew28 in tandem with the 
demand for business ventures and corporate charters.29  As a result, a 
number of states enacted general business corporate statutes and the 
incorporation process was increasingly uniform.30 
In the 1800s, America experienced an industrial revolution. The 
explosion of industry transformed an agrarian America into an industrial 
society.31 This change required large infusions of capital to fund 
development and growth.32 Fueling industrial growth was the emergence 
of markets in which all Americans could invest in private corporations 
for profit. Previously, investment was an activity only available to the 
rich. The expanded pool of investors needed stock markets33 in which 
they could acquire and dispose of their holdings. 
 26. See Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility: A 
Continuation of Willard Hurst’s Study of Corporations, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 81, 93 
(1999).  “As the eighteenth century came to a close and the early decades of the 
nineteenth century unfolded, state legislatures began to issue significant numbers of 
corporate charters for banks and transportation projects.” Id. 
 27. See ALFRED F. CONARD & HENRY M. BUTZEL, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 
178 (Foundation Press 1976).  “[I]ncorporation was the formation of a contract which 
was unconditionally binding on all of the parties. The principle escape hatch was the 
expiration of the contract; many early corporations were apparently formed for limited 
terms, and some 19th century laws required limitations ranging from 25 to 100 years.”  
Id.  The idea that a corporation has an expiration date is no longer espoused, and most 
modern day “corporation codes grant perpetual life.”  Id. 
 28. See Hamill, supra note 26, at 92.  “the colonial assemblies and the early state 
legislatures issued the vast majority of corporate charters for public purposes.” Id. 
 29. Id. at 97-98. 
 30. Id. at 101-03. 
 31. See id. at 98. “America’s transformation from a predominantly agricultural and 
mercantile economy to a market economy displaced and negatively affected many 
individuals.” Id. 
 32. See id. at 98. “[F]or most of the 1820s, business and commerce grew steadily, 
and the state-chartered business corporation, which was on its way to becoming the 
dominant legal form for conducting all commercial enterprises, experienced little overt 
controversy.” Id. 
 33. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1554 (9th ed. 2009).  The business of a stock 
market is to facilitate investors coming together to buy and sell stocks. Id. 
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B.  Anti-Fraud Provisions of Blue Sky Laws 
Initially, regulation did not keep pace with the development of 
markets. During the late 1800s and early 1900s, the federal securities 
laws did not exist.34 In 1911, Kansas became the first state to create state 
securities laws to protect its residents.35 Throughout the 1920s, many 
states adopted securities laws to protect their residents.36 New York 
developed its famous securities laws through the adoption of the 1921 
Martin-Webb Act.37 Many other states followed suit and began to adopt 
state securities laws commonly referred to as blue sky laws,38 so-named 
when the Supreme Court explained, in Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., “[t]he 
name that is given to the law indicates the evil at which it is aimed . . . 
[the] ‘speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet 
of blue sky . . . .”39 
Despite the Court’s appreciation of the legislative intent behind the 
 
 34. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the 
Institutionalization of the Securities Market, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1028 (2009).  The 
Federal Trade Commission acquired jurisdiction to pass the first federal securities laws 
in 1933. Id. 
 35. See Jonathan M. Sobel, A Rose May Not Always Be a Rose: Some General 
Partnership Interests Should Be Deemed Securities Under the Federal Securities Acts, 
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1313, 1323 n.49 (1994). 
 36. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Origins of the Blue-Sky Laws: A Test of Competing 
Hypotheses, 46 J.L. & ECON. 229, 229 (2003) (“Between 1911 and 1931, 47 of the 48 
states adopted statutes that regulated the sale of securities.”). See also CONARD & 
BUTZEL, supra note 27, at 22 (discussing how Kansas took the lead among state 
legislatures passing securities laws requiring substantial disclosures and laying hefty 
penalties for non-compliance). 
 37. See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352 (McKinney 2009).  Former New York State 
Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, used the Martin Act vigorously between 2001 and 2006 
to prosecute financial service entities that defrauded New York State residents. See 
MASTERS, supra note 4, 70-72, 88-99. 
 38. SEC, Blue Sky Laws, http://www.sec.gov/answers.shtml (last visited Oct. 7, 
2009) (defining blue sky laws as state securities laws that are designed to protect 
investors against fraudulent sales practices and activities). See Mahoney, supra note 36, 
at 229. 
 39. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1916) (stating that name [blue 
sky] comes from testimony that such state statutes protect investors from “speculative 
schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of ‘blue sky’”). “[T]he law is a 
regulation of business, [it] constrains conduct only to that end, the purpose being to 
protect the public against the imposition of unsubstantial schemes and the securities 
based upon them.” Id. 
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statutes, remedies were limited. Very few blue sky laws provided a 
private right of action.40  Only state regulators could commence lawsuits 
against corporations on behalf of the injured shareholders and state 
residents. In addition, corporations were required to provide full and fair 
disclosure as to the purpose of the investment.41  Several states also 
allowed state regulators to prevent the filing of a security offering if they 
had reason to believe that a particular securities offering would result in 
a fraud, inequity, or that the offering failed to meet the standard of being 
fair, just, and equitable.42 
New York’s 1921 enactment43 of the Martin Act finally enshrined 
the principle “thou shall not commit fraud” into state law.44 The Martin 
Act vested the power to prosecute fraud, but only minimal control over 
the sale of securities, in the New York Attorney General’s Office. The 
original Martin Act was a weak law and no enforcement actions were 
commenced for years after its adoption.  In 1925, New York State 
Attorney General Albert Ottinger successfully advanced a broad view of 
the Attorney General’s Office’s powers under the Martin Act. “Ottinger 
sought out high-profile fraud cases and used the Martin Act to shut 
down the Consolidated Stock Exchange”.45 While Ottinger’s actions 
 40. See, e.g., Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. 
Secs., 592 F. Supp. 2d 608, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (stating there is no implied right of 
action under New York’s Martin Act); In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., 541 F. 
Supp. 2d 986, 1010 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (stating that while New Jersey and Oregon’s Blue 
Sky Laws delineated prohibited conduct and allowed for civil remedies, neither 
provided a private right of action); Pearce v. Duchesneau Group, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 2d 
63, 76 (D. Mass. 2005) (stating that plaintiff faced a problem because Massachusetts 
Blue Sky Laws did not provide a private right of action). 
 41. See Mahoney, supra note 36, at 231. “Prior to selling a security in Kansas, the 
issuer had to file an application with the banking commissioner detailing financial and 
narrative information about its business. No sales could be made unless the 
commissioner approved the offering.” Id. 
 42. See id.  “[T]he commissioner . . . could reject an offering if he concluded that 
the issuer ‘[did] not intend to do a fair and honest business’ or ‘[did] not promise a fair 
return on the stocks, bonds, or other securities it offered for sale.’ This broad authority 
came to be known as ‘merit review.’” Id. 
 43. See MASTERS, supra note 4, at 49. 
 44. See Symposium, Sixth Annual Corporate Law Symposium: Contemporary 
Issues in Securities Regulations, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 393 (1993) (stating that “blue sky 
laws” were enacted to provide regulation of securities offerings/sales for the purpose of 
preventing fraud). 
 45. Nicholas Thompson, The Sword of Spitzer, LEGAL AFFAIRS, May/June 2004, at 
50.  Attorney General Ottinger summed up his record as “Hammer, hammer, hammer, 
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angered major financial institutions and prompted several prominent 
court challenges, a series of favorable court rulings noted endemic fraud 
called for an expansion of the Martin Act.46 In 1955, Attorney General 
Jacob Javits appointed David Clurman to rewrite the Martin Act in a 
manner more protective of the public. Clurman, building on the 
interpretation of the mail-fraud statutes by Judge Learned Hand a few 
decades earlier, drafted provisions which granted the Attorney General 
civil and criminal prosecution power. Other provisions relieved the 
Attorney General of the responsibility to prove any buyer was actually 
defrauded or sale actually took place. Such measures allowed the 
Attorney General to prosecute fraudulent schemes before investors were 
victimized by the schemes. Clurman’s mandate was simple: “thou shall 
not commit fraud.”47 Since Clurman’s revisions, the Martin Act has 
evolved into a broad sweeping investigative statute. 
The Martin Act provided New York State Attorney General Eliot 
Spitzer with broad civil and criminal powers to prosecute entities for 
financial fraud.48 Spitzer’s Office initiated a Martin Act investigation of 
Merrill Lynch in April 2001 for failure to disclose conflict of interest 
between Merrill Lynch’s investment banking business and research 
department based. Spitzer built the case against Merrill, in part, on e-
mails sent from stock analyst Henry Blodget.49  Emails snippets 
suggested the technology analyst routinely recommended stocks he did 
not personally believe where worthwhile.50  Merrill agreed to a 
settlement within a few weeks and paid $100 million in penalty. 
In 2002, Eliot Spitzer’s Office initiated a Martin Act investigation 
at every manner and means of fraud and dishonesty, the prevention and assertion of 
which the Legislature has assigned to the Attorney General.” Id. at 51-52. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Thompson, supra note 45, at 50. 
 48. See Dietrich L. Snell & Wendy T. Wu, New York State’s Martin Act an Outline 
of the New York Attorney General’s Powers and Practices, in PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS 
IN SECURITIES ACTIONS (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series, PLI Order 
No. 14655, 2008). 
 49. See Charles Gasparino, The Stock-Research Pact: How Settlement Train Kept 
on Track, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2002, at C1. 
 50. Press Release, Office of the New York State Attorney General, Spitzer, Merrill 
Lynch Reach Unprecedented Agreement to Reform Investment Practices (May 21, 
2002), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2002/may/may21a_ 
02.html; but see John J. McConnell, Spitzer Spears the Truth, WALL ST. J., May 15, 
2002, at A18 (arguing “[u]pon closer examination, however, [Spitzer’s] charges appear 
to be a fundamental mischaracterization of the messages in question”). 
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against several investment banking firms.51 Allegations suggested the 
banks inflated stock prices through the issuance of research reports by 
their affiliated brokerage firms and doled out valuable opportunities to 
invest early in initial public offerings to influential members of the 
business community in order to curry their favor. The banks entered into 
a global settlement and paid approximately $1.4 billion in fines.52 The 
settlement also required the firms to establish compliance divisions to 
supervise stock analysts and investment bankers and insulate stock 
analysts from internal pressure to attract investment banking business.53 
In 2003, Eliot Spitzer’s Office started a Martin Act investigation 
against several commercial banks, mutual funds and hedge funds which 
led to the disclosure of one of the greatest frauds against the investing 
public. Spitzer’s Office investigation revealed that mutual funds failed to 
disclose that they allowed select clients (primarily hedge funds) trading 
privileges which harmed ordinary investors. Spitzer’s Office targeted 
two practices, in particular, late trading54 and market timing.55  Through 
a series of prosecutions and lawsuits, joined in many instances by the 
SEC, the CFTC,56 and various state securities regulators, Spitzer’s 
 51. Ten investment banking firms were named in the complaint including Bear 
Stearns, Credit Suisse First Boston, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan 
Chase, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Salomon Smith Barney, and 
UBS Warburg. Jane Ulick, Wall Street Deal Inked, CNNMONEY, Dec. 20, 2001, 
http://money.cnn.com/2002/12/20/news/economy/settlement_wallstreet/index.htm. 
 52. Press Release, SEC, Ten of Nation’s Top Investment Firms Settle Enforcement 
Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Investment Banking 
(Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 55. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 56. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission is hereinafter referred to as the 
CFTC.  However, certain footnotes cite to the CFTC as the Commission.  See 7 U.S.C. 
§ 2(a)(2) (2006) (establishing Commodity Futures Trading Commission as an 
independent agency under Commodity Exchange Act).  The statute provides, in relevant 
part: 
The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . over accounts, agreements . . . 
and transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery . . . , 
traded or executed on a contract market designated or derivatives transaction 
execution facility registered pursuant to section 7 or 7a [7 U.S.C. § 7] or any other 
board of trade, exchange, or market, and transaction subject to regulation by the 
Commission pursuant to [7 U.S.C. § 23]. 
7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A). 
The CFTC describes itself as an independent agency with the mandate to regulate 
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Office secured approximately $2 billion in fines and remuneration for 
investors as well as forcing many managerial reforms within the mutual 
fund industry to protect the investing public. 
C.  Disclosure Under the Federal Securities Laws to Protect Investors 
Federal rules were designed to protect the general public from fraud 
in the securities market. The laws’ mechanisms for protection include 
disclosure and trading restrictions.  The Securities Act requires a 
securities issuer, typically a mid-sized to large corporation, to disclose a 
broad array of financial and operational information in exchange for the 
right to sell stocks to the public in the capital markets.57  Congress 
established the Exchange Act to prevent manipulation of the secondary 
market for an issuer’s outstanding publicly traded securities. The issuer 
must continually appraise the public about the state of its operations and 
finances.58 The issuer’s insiders, including members of its board of 
directors, its officers, employees and advisers, are subject to trading 
restrictions if they possess certain non-public information.59 
The stock market crash of 1929,60 and the subsequent Great 
 
commodity futures and option markets in the United States.  The agency’s mandate has 
been renewed and expanded several times since its establishment, most recently by the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (“CFMA”). Pub. L. No. 106-554 § 
1(a)(5), 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (enacting into law § 401 of Title IV of H.R. 5660, 114 
Stat. 2763A-457, as introduced on Dec. 14, 2000) (codified in 7 U.S.C. § 2).  Today, the 
CFTC assures the economic utility of the futures market by encouraging 
competitiveness and efficiency, ensuring integrity, protecting market participants 
against manipulation, abusive trading practices, fraud, and ensuring the financial 
integrity of the clearing process.  The CFTC enables the futures market to serve the 
important function of providing a means for price discovery and offsetting price risk. 
 57. See 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2006). 
 58. See Loomis, supra note 19, at 214-15. 
 59. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009). 
 60. See, e.g., Great N. Ry. Co. v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135, 149 (1936) (stating that the 
stock market crash of 1929 ushered in the Great Depression); see Ben Wattenberg, 
Stock Market Crash, The First Measured Century, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/fmc/ 
timeline/estockmktcrash.htm (hereinafter Wattenberg). From 1920 to 1929 stocks more 
than quadrupled in value. Id. See also In re Pate’s Estate, 84 N.Y.S.2d 853, 856 (N.Y. 
Sur. 1948). 
Many investors became convinced that stocks were a sure thing and borrowed heavily 
to invest more money in the market.  But in 1929, the bubble burst and stocks started 
down an even more precipitous cliff. In 1932 and 1933, they hit bottom, down about 
80% from their highs in the late 1920s. This had sharp effects on the economy . . . 
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Depression61 led Congress to enact the Securities Act62 and the 
Securities Exchange Act.63  The public policy imperative, to protect the 
investing public through the promotion of equal access to information 
for all market participants, has not changed since Congress enacted the 
Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act.64 
[and it caused] chaos in the banking system as banks tried to collect on loans made to 
stock market investors whose holdings were now worth little or nothing at all. Worse, 
many banks had themselves invested depositors’ money in the stock market. When 
word spread that banks’ assets contained huge uncollectable loans and almost 
worthless stock certificates, depositors rushed to withdraw their savings. Unable to 
raise fresh funds from the Federal Reserve System, banks began failing by the 
hundreds in 1932 and 1933. . . .  [T]he banking system of the United States had 
largely ceased to function. Depositors had seen $140 billion disappear when their 
banks failed. 
Wattenberg, supra.  As a result, the federal government established the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation to ensure depositors’ money; the government promise to 
reimburse depositors. Id. 
 61. See JOHN P. MORIARTY & CURTLAN R. MCNEILY, 19 REGULATION OF 
FINANCIAL PLANNERS § 3:1 n.1 (2009) (“The Advisers Act was the end of a string of 
federal statutes enacted to correct conditions which Congress believed had contributed 
to the 1929 stock market crash and the Great Depression which followed. Specifically, 
the Advisers Act was adopted to correct the ‘problems and abuses’ in investment 
counselling services.” (citing S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 21 (1940))). 
 62. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77aa (2006). 
 63. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78oo (2006). 
 64. See Andrew Downey Orrick, Commissioner, Securities & Exchange 
Commission, Address at Town Hall, Los Angeles, California:  What Is the SEC Doing 
to Protect the Public from Securities Fraud 1 (Nov. 13, 1956) (transcript available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1956/111356orrick.pdf).  “The mission of the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and 
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.” Investor’s Advocate, supra note 10. 
[T]he SEC requires public companies to disclose meaningful financial and other 
information to the public. This provides a common pool of knowledge for all investors 
to use to judge for themselves whether to buy, sell, or hold a particular security. Only 
through the steady flow of timely, comprehensive, and accurate information can 
people make sound investment decisions. The result of this information flow is a far 
more active, efficient, and transparent capital market that facilitates the capital 
formation so important to our nation’s economy. To insure that this objective is 
always being met, the SEC continually works with all major market participants, 
including especially the investors in the securities markets, to listen to their concerns 
and to learn from their experience. The SEC oversees the key participants in the 
securities world, including securities exchanges, securities brokers and dealers, 
investment advisors, and mutual funds. Here the SEC is concerned primarily with 
promoting the disclosure of important market-related information, maintaining fair 
dealing, and protecting against fraud. 
Id. 
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Disclosure remains the heart of the regulatory scheme.  
“[P]rofessional market participants [must] assimilate publicly available 
information and disseminate it to the investing public.”65  Investors are 
expected to read and comprehend this material for their own 
protection.66  Mandatory and ongoing disclosure by publicly-traded 
companies facilitates investor education.  All securities are registered 
under the Securities Act67 and issuers must comply with the disclosure 
requirements under the Securities Exchange Act, and the Investment 
Advisers Act.68 Provisions of the Investment Company Act may also 
apply.69 
The hedge fund industry argues transactional risk and compliance 
with federal securities laws is regulated under the laws which apply to 
the public companies with which they trade.70  Specifically, hedge funds 
argue, heavily regulated banks, broker-dealers and insurance companies 
 65. Henry Odower, Demystifying Hedge Funds:  A Design Primer, 7 U.C. DAVIS 
BUS. L.J. 323, 331 (2007). 
 66. See Vadim Kotelnikov, Venture Financing: Process and Selection Criteria, 
http://www.1000ventures.com/venture_financing/due_diligence.html (last visited Oct. 
3, 2009).  “Due diligence emphasizes understanding and quantifying the risk of the 
proposed deal, rather than the upside.” Id. 
 67. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2006) (“[t]he term 
‘security’ means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, 
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing 
agreement . . . .”). 
 68. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2006).  “[T]he 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 emerged as a statute which would require investment 
advisers to register and to furnish certain information about themselves, thus providing 
a ‘compulsory census’ of investment advisers and which would provide ‘in a small 
degree for the regulation of some of their activities.” Loomis, supra note 19, at 218, 
245. 
 69. See Laurin Blumenthal Kleiman & Carla G. Teodoro, Forming, Organizing 
and Operating a Mutual Fund—Legal and Practical Considerations, in THE ABCS OF 
MUTUAL FUNDS 11, 15, 37 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series, PLI 
Order No. 18809, 2006). “Funds that are excepted from the definition of ‘investment 
company,’ as that term is defined under the Investment Company Act, under certain 
provisions that strictly limit the manner in which fund interests are sold and the number 
and/or qualifications of their investors. These unregistered funds are offered privately 
and are commonly referred to as ‘hedge funds.’” Id. at 15. 
 70. Dale A. Oesterle, Regulating Hedge Funds (Ohio State Public Law Working 
Paper No. 71 & Center for Interdisciplinary Law and Policy Studies Working Paper 
Series No. 47, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=913045 [hereinafter Oesterle 
Report]. 
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are required to implement proper internal controls to monitor their 
exposure to hedge fund activity and potential losses.71  They also argue 
the economic efficiency and capital allocation benefits they provide to 
the markets outweigh the potential risk of loss their counterparties 
face.72  Disclosure, the industry argues, is  valuable where the economic 
benefits of disclosure are equal to its economic cost.73  Still, even the 
industry must acknowledge the many ways they benefit from disclosure: 
the possibility of achieving more favorable terms on loans, lower costs 
of trading and increased attractiveness to investors.74 
Some argue regulation would hinder hedge funds competitive 
advantage75 and favor measures to even the playing field.  They call for 
the deregulation of registered investment companies, like mutual funds, 
so a broader range of investors can enjoy the same advantages as hedge 
funds.76 Such sentiments are misguided. Many of the strategies hedge 
funds employ; short-selling, excessive leverage and strategic publication 
of negative research reports; are inappropriate for mutual funds.  
Registered companies profitability is better achieved through long-term 
growth than a methodological race to the bottom in which even 
unscrupulous means of turning a profit are permitted and encouraged.77  
A mutual fund’s performance should not be a function of indiscriminate 
use of any and all strategies with the potential to generate double digit 
returns, irrespective of the impact of said strategies on the markets and 
global economy. 
The main purpose of federal regulation is protection of the general 
public even to the extent of foregoing the extraordinary profits.  Other 
 71. See Editorial, Hedge Fund Realities, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2007, at A18. See 
infra note 200 and accompanying text for a discussion on Lehman Brothers and how 
regulated companies are unable to properly monitor and quantify their potential losses 
as a result of engaging in hedge fund activities. 
 72. See J.W. Verret, Dr. Jones and the Raiders of Lost Capital: Hedge Fund 
Regulation, Part II, A Self-Regulation Proposal, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 799, 815 (2007). 
 73. See Kathleen E. Lange, The New Antifraud Rule: Is SEC Enforcement the Most 
Effective Way to Protect Investors from Hedge Fund Fraud?, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 
882 (2008). 
 74. Houman B. Shadab, The Challenge of Hedge Fund Regulation: As Other 
Nations Expand Access to Hedge Funds, Should the U.S. Adopt Tighter Regulation?, 
ALLBUSINESS.COM (Mar. 22, 2007), http://www.allbusiness.com/banking-finance/ 
financial-markets-investing-funds/8940884-1.html. 
 75. See Oesterle Report, supra note 70. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See, e.g., Verret, supra note 72, at 824. 
2009 HEDGE FUND FRAUD 41 
AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 
 
commentators argue that the SEC is a reactionary agency. In the absence 
of a crisis, they say, it is unlikely the SEC or any other regulators will 
move to reform the hedge fund industry.78 Today’s dire economic times 
are ripe for decisive congressional action to adopt comprehensive hedge 
fund regulation. 
II.  UNDERSTANDING HEDGE FUNDS 
No enterprise is more likely to succeed than one concealed 
 from the enemy until it is ripe for execution. 
 —Niccolo Machiavelli79 
“Who are [hedge fund managers] and what are they doing?”80  
There is not a single definition of hedge funds.81  The term hedge fund 
was first used by Alfred Winslow Jones in 194982 when he attempted to 
manage a fund comprised of pooled investments.  The pool consisted of 
 78. See Roberta S. Karmel, The SEC at 70: Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge 
Funds and Stock Market Volatility—What Regulation by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission Is Appropriate?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909, 949 (2005) (arguing that 
“in the absence of a new crisis involving derivatives, excessive leverage in the market 
or manipulative activities by institutional investors, it is unlikely that Congress, the SEC 
or any other financial regulator will decide to study and reform institutional investors’ 
behavior”). 
 79. NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE ART OF WAR 202 (Ellis Farneworth trans., De 
Capo Press, 2d ed. 2001) (1520). 
 80. Kara Scannell et al., No Consensus on Regulating Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 5, 2007, at C1 (quoting Lisa McGreevy, Director, Managed Funds Ass’n). 
 81. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (stating there is 
no single definition of the phrase “hedge fund”); see also SEC STAFF, IMPLICATIONS OF 
THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS 9-10 (2003) [hereinafter SEC STAFF REPORT], available 
at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf; Troy A. Paredes, Hedge 
Funds and the SEC: Observations on the How and Why of Securities 1-2 (Wash. Univ. 
Sch. of Law, Faculty Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 07-05-01, 2007), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=984450 (citing ROGER 
LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL 
MANAGEMENT (2000)). 
 82. Douglas W. Hawes, Hedge Funds—Investment Funds for the Rich, 23 BUS. 
LAWYER 576, 577 (1967-68) (stating that the first hedge fund was established by A.W. 
Jones & Co. in 1949); see also Carol Loomis, The Jones Nobody Keeps Up With, 
FORTUNE, Apr. 2006, at 237; Stephen J. Brown, Keynote Address at the PACAP/FMA 
Meeting, Melbourne, Australia: Hedge Funds: Omniscient or Just Plain Wrong (July 7, 
2000), available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~sbrown/omniscient.pdf. 
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various investors and Jones used an investing strategy of long and short 
equity positions.83  Jones envisioned that short sales of the equity 
positions would counter-balance the risk of holding long positions.  In 
turn, the strategy would allow for capital appreciation while “hedging” 
against risk of loss due to events in the market.84  One court85 noted the 
phrase ‘hedge fund’ better described the legal management structure 
than the investment strategy used by the fund.86  Hedge funds are 
intentionally structured to minimize federal regulation, federal and state 
taxes, and to maximize trading strategies which result in phenomenal 
returns.87 
In general, hedge funds are unregulated pools of private money.88  
They are funded with capital in search of an investment vehicle which 
utilizes sophisticated financial strategies in the securities, currency, and 
derivative markets to obtain above average returns.  Some hedge fund 
managers achieve lofty returns for their clients and are handsomely 
rewarded. Hedge fund managers typically receive a one to two percent 
annual management fee and twenty percent of any profits.89 In 2005, the 
top 25 hedge funds took in more than $130 million in fees.90 
 83. See Loomis, supra note 82, at 237. 
 84. See Brown, supra note 82, at 5; see also Loomis, supra note 82, at 240. 
 85. See Brown, supra note 82, at 5; see also Loomis, supra note 82, at 240. 
 86. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“distinctive feature of 
hedge funds is their management structure”). “[D]omestic hedge funds are usually 
structured as limited partnerships to achieve maximum separation of ownership and 
management.” Id. 
 87. See Henry Ordower, Demystifying Hedge Funds: A Design Primer, 7 U.C. 
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 323, 330 (2007) (describing popular hedge fund structures to avoid 
registration, and explaining the regulatory planning that accounts for hedge fund 
success). 
 88. See id. at 324.  Private money is defined as money raised by hedge funds from 
wealthy and institutional investors utilizing the “private offering” exemption under the 
1933 Securities Act, Regulation 506 of Regulation D. See STUART A. MCCRARY, 
HEDGE FUND COURSE 129 (2005); see also15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006). 
 89. See SCOTT J. LEDERMAN, HEDGE FUNDS IN FINANCIAL PRODUCT 
FUNDAMENTALS: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS 11:2.2, at 11-15 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed. 2000). 
See also Jenny Anderson, Atop Hedge Funds, Richest of the Rich Get Even More So, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at C2 (“[the] magic behind the money is [the] compensation 
structure of hedge funds”).  Endowments and pensions funds flocked to invest in hedge 
funds, further fueling the hedge fund boom. Id. 
 90. See Oesterle Report, supra note 70 (stating that the hedge fund managers who 
are able to deliver high returns will be able to create new, “follow-up funds” to which 
investors will continue to flock with the expectation of receiving the same fabulous 
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A.  Brief History of Hedge Funds 
In theory, a hedge should deliver positive returns in any market 
cycle.91  Hedge funds’ most attractive trait is their theoretical ability to 
earn positive returns un- or minimally correlated with macroeconomic 
market returns92 or volatility.93  In the parlance of sophisticated 
investors, hedge funds provide excellent ‘alpha,’ or risk adjusted 
performance.94  As a class, the hedge fund sector was spared from the 
damage inflicted when the internet bubble of the late 1990s bursted 
shortly after the turn of the twenty-first century.95 Such returns, 
especially in declining or ‘bear’ markets, are arguably bolstered by 
hedge funds’ ability to exploit lax trading regulations to profit from the 
misfortune of others;96 hedge funds are more likely to employ short-
selling97 and other trading strategies which enable them to profit from 
 
returns). 
 91. See Erika Kinetz, Little Guys in the Big Leagues, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 8, 
2005, at § 3. 
 92. See David J. Brophy et al., Hedge Funds as Investors of Last Resort, 22 REV. 
FIN. STUDIES 541 (2009) (stating that struggling companies that receive financing from 
hedge funds significantly underperform as compared to struggling companies that 
receive funding elsewhere). 
 93. Nicole M. Boyson et al., Is There Hedge Fund Contagion? (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper 12090, 2006); Bing Liang et al., Market Volatility, 
Investor Flows and the Structure of Hedge Fund Markets (Inst. for Quantitative 
Research in Fin., Working Paper, 2006); see also Barry Riley, Editorial, Weekend 
Money: Through the Hedge Fund Maze: Do British Investors Really Need These 
“Alternative Strategists?”, FIN. TIMES MANDATE, May 11, 1996 (“you could call most 
of them speculators”). 
 94. Nicholas Chan et al., Systemic Risk and Hedge Funds, in THE RISKS OF 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 235 (Mark Carey & René Stultz eds., Univ. of Chicago Press 
2007); Robert Kosowski et al., Do Hedge Funds Deliver Alpha? A Bayesian and 
Bootstrap Analysis, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 229 (2007). 
 95. See Emma Trincal, Merrill Says Diversify with Bonds, Not Hedge Funds, 
HEDGEWORLD DAILY NEWS, Feb. 26, 2008 (stating hedge funds were “an asset class 
that investors found attractive for downside protection during the bear market that 
followed the burst of the Internet bubble”). 
 96. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 81, at 31. 
 97. See id. at 34-35; Investopedia.com, Short Selling, http://www.investopedia. 
com/terms/s/shortselling.asp (“[t]he selling of a security that the seller does not own, or 
any sale that is completed by the delivery of a security borrowed by the seller. Short 
sellers assume that they will be able to buy the stock at a lower amount than the price at 
which they sold short”); see also SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 81, at 33-36; Hedge 
Fund Research, Strategy Definitions (2001), available at http://www.hedgefund 
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market declines.98 
Despite the hedge fund industry’s complexity and technology, 
hedge funds have not historically outperformed market indexes. 99  In 
fact, hedge funds do not display any stock picking ability superior to the 
average investor.100  A recent study determined the average investor 
would fare better in a passive and diversified portfolio101 given the 
efficient market hypothesis, which postulates current prices reflect all 
available knowledge material to the performance of a public company.  
If accepted, an attempt to select undervalued stocks is an exercise in 
futility.102 
Hedge funds investments are typically subject to a “lock-in” 
arrangement.  During the lock-up period investors may not withdraw 
their funds.103  Lock-up periods can range from six months to five 
years.104  Lock-up period restrictions apply to investors’ ability to 
transfer or sell their interest in a hedge fund.105  Even after the expiration 
of the lock-up period, investors may not transfer or sell their interests in 
a hedge fund without the hedge fund manager’s prior written consent.106  
These restrictions on transferability are the mechanism most hedge 
funds use to induce wealthy investors to invest in other funds within the 
hedge fund family.107 The measures to restrict the ability of investors to 
transfer their interest in the fund also further the funds’ efforts to 
preserve their private offerings exemption. 
research.com/pdf/HFR_Strategy_Definitions.pdf. 
 98. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 81, at 36. 
 99. See Patrick Darby, Southeast and New England Mean New York: The Rule of 
Explicitness and Post-Bankruptcy Interest on Secured Debt, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 467, 469 
n.6 (2008). 
 100. See Riley, supra note 93 (“you could call most of them speculators”). 
 101. Burton G. Malkiel & Antanu Saha, Hedge Funds: Risk and Return, 61(6) FIN. 
ANALYSTS J. 80 (2005). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 81, at ix. 
 104. Citigroup Alternative Investments, Hedge Fund Primer: A Guide to Investing 
in Hedge Funds (2004), available athttp://www.smithbarney.com/pdf/HedgeFund 
Prime_0305.pdf [hereinafter Hedge Fund Primer] (stating most hedge funds disclose the 
lockup period of six months to five years during which an investment cannot be 
redeemed). 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Oesterle Report, supra note 70, at p. 4 n.22. 
 107. Id. 
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B.  Hedge Funds Distinguished from Mutual Funds 
Although hedge funds and mutual funds are both pooled investment 
vehicles, the similarity between the two types of funds ends there. 
Hedge funds’ legal structures, management, size, investor qualification 
requirements and regulation differ dramatically from mutual funds.108   
Mutual funds are heavily regulated.  The Investment Company 
Act109  applies to mutual funds.110  It requires all mutual funds to 
register,111 limit insider transactions,112 maintain sufficient liquidity for 
investor redemption requests113 and adhere to portfolio pricing rules.114 
The Act effectively imposes debt aversion on mutual funds by imposing 
very restrictive leverage limitations on registered mutual fund 
companies.115  Furthermore, mutual fund companies are prohibited from 
buying securities on margin,116 and shorting117 stocks.118  The 
Investment Company Act explains, “the national public interest and the 
interest of investors are adversely affected” when the interests of fund 
insiders and those they contract with, among others, prevail over, “the 
interest of all classes of such companies’ security holders. . . .”119 
 
Disclosure is a key component of the Investment Company Act’s 
regulatory regime for the mutual fund industry.120  Mutual funds are 
 108. See Hedge Fund Primer, supra note 104. 
 109. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-22 (2006). 
 110. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16 (2006) (covering board of directors and elections). 
 111. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2006). 
 112. See §§ 80a-9, 80a-10, 80a-12, 80a-17 (limiting transactions with affiliated 
persons as employees, directors, overlapping ownership, and prohibited transactions). 
 113. See § 80a-22 (covering purchase and sale of shares in the company). 
 114. See id. 
 115. Section 1 of the Act provides, in relevant part, that “the national public interest 
and the interest of investors are adversely affected . . . (7) when investment companies 
by excessive borrowing and the issuance of excessive amounts of senior securities 
increase unduly the speculative character of their junior securities . . . .” § 80a-1(b). See 
also §§ 80a-18(a), 80a-18(f) (2006) (specifying debt requirements applicable to closed-
end funds and open-end funds). 
 116. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(a)(1) (2006). 
 117. See supra note 97 and the accompanying discussion. 
 118. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(a)(3). 
 119. Id. § 80a-1(b)(2). 
 120. See, e.g., Enhanced Disclosure and New Prospectus Delivery Option, For 
Registered Open-End Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 
8998; Investment Company Act Release No. 28,584 (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230, 232, 
239, 274 (2009)) (promulgating new mutual fund disclosure rules which require the 
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required to disclose121 some information about their portfolio 
holdings,122 such as a list of the fund’s portfolio securities holdings as of 
the date of the particular report, on a biannual basis.123  Only seven of 
the top 25 largest mutual fund companies allow investors to examine 
their full portfolios more frequently.124 
C.  Federal Exemptions Allow Hedge Funds to Avoid Regulation 
Federal securities laws restrict the ability to invest in hedge funds to 
wealthy or sophisticated investors, defined under the Securities Act as 
accredited investors.125 Hedge funds, by contrast, fall under many 
 
provision of a plain English prospectus). 
 121. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(e) (2006). 
 122. See SEC, Investing Wisely, http://sec.gov/investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2009) (stating investors cannot easily ascertain the exact make-up of their 
fund portfolio at any given time). 
 123. See David Dietz, What’s the Big Secret About Mutual Fund Holdings, 
THESTREET.COM, Apr. 26, 2000, http://www.thestreet.com/story/925755/whats-the-big-
secret-about-mutual-fund-holdings.html. 
 124. Id. 
 125. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission defines “accredited investors” 
as:  
(1) a bank, insurance company, registered investment company, business development 
company, or small business investment company; (2) an employee benefit plan, 
within the meaning of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, if a bank, 
insurance company, or registered investment adviser makes the investment decisions, 
or if the plan has total assets in excess of $5 million; (3) a charitable organization, 
corporation, or partnership with assets exceeding $5 million; (4) a director, executive 
officer, or general partner of the company selling the securities; (5) a business in 
which all the equity owners are accredited investors; (6) a natural person who has 
individual net worth, or joint net worth with the person’s spouse, that exceeds $1 
million at the time of the purchase; (7) a natural person with income exceeding 
$200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income with a spouse 
exceeding $300,000 for those years and a reasonable expectation of the same income 
level in the current year; or (8) a trust with assets in excess of $5 million, not formed 
to acquire the securities offered, whose purchases a sophisticated person makes.  
SEC, Rule 501 of Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) 
(2009); see also Charles Stein, The Smart Money Is Going into Hedge Funds, But How 
Smart Is It?, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 24, 2004, at F1 (“hedge funds are only available to 
institutional investors and only the most wealthy individuals”).  However, the 
popularity of hedge funds may eventually undermine their performance by decreasing 
profit margins. See id. (“[t]he return will gradually decline until they get to be very 
uninteresting” (quoting Jack Meyer, President of Harvard Management, the investment 
arm of Harvard University)). 
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Securities Act exemptions from SEC regulation.126 The exceptions 
involve institutional or wealthy accredited individuals,127 and in 
particular, the Securities Act provides exemptions for private placement 
offerings.128 These offerings are securities not offered to the general 
public rather they are offered privately to wealthy accredited or 
institutional investors who have the ability to assess the risk of the 
particular security offered. Private placement offerings are exempt under 
section 4(2) of the Securities Act.129  The Securities Act creates certain 
safe harbors which afford private placement issuers the protection of the 
section 4(2) exemption, if the requisite guidelines set forth by SEC rules, 
commonly referred to as Regulation D, are observed.130 
 126. See Ordower, supra note 87, at 324. 
 127. See id. at 324-25. 
 128. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(1), (2) (2006); see also Gustafson v. Alloyd 
Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 591 (1995). 
 129. Section 4 of the Securities Act, Exempted Transactions, provides in relevant 
part, that the provisions of Section 5 shall not apply to: 
(1) transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer. 
(2) transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering. 
(3) transactions by a dealer (including an underwriter no longer acting as an 
underwriter in respect of the security involved in such transaction), except— 
*     *     * 
(4) brokers’ transactions executed upon customers’ orders on any exchange or in the 
over-the-counter market but not the solicitation of such orders. 
(5)(A) Transactions involving offers or sales of one or more promissory notes directly 
secured by a first lien on a single parcel of real estate upon which is located a 
dwelling or 
*     *     * 
(B) Transactions between any of the entities described in subparagraph (A)(i) or 
(A)(ii) involving non-assignable contracts to buy or sell the foregoing securities . . . or 
(C) The exemption provided by subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall not apply to resales 
of the securities acquired pursuant thereto . . . . 
(6) transactions involving offers or sales by an issuer solely to one or more accredited 
investors . . . . 
Securities Act of 1933, Section 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006). 
 130. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2009).  Rule 506 of Regulation D is considered a 
“safe harbor” for the private offering exemption of Section 4(2) of the Securities Act. 
See SEC, Rule 506 of Regulation D, http://www.sec.gov/answers/rule506.htm (last 
visited Sept. 10, 2009). Companies using the Rule 506 exemption can raise an unlimited 
amount of money. Id. A company can be assured it is within the Section 4(2) exemption 
by satisfying the following standards: 
  The company cannot use general solicitation or advertising to market the 
securities; 
  The company may sell its securities to an unlimited number of “accredited 
investors” and up to 35 other purchases. Unlike Rule 505, all non-accredited 
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Qualified private offerings are only marketed to institutional or 
accredited investors.  In order to fall within the safe harbor of Rule 506, 
hedge funds are prohibited from marketing, or using any type of general 
solicitation or general advertising131 to the general public.132  The SEC 
applies a pre-existing, substantive relationship133 standard when it 
determines whether a hedge fund violated the general solicitation rule.  
The standard is analogous to a strict liability standard.  Once the SEC 
determines a hedge fund made a non-solicited advertisement to at least 
one investor in the fund, the hedge fund automatically loses the 
exemption.134  Mindful of this rule, hedge funds are very careful not to 
violate the SEC general solicitation requirements; they do not send out 
glossy brochures to prospective investors or provide detailed 
information about their trading philosophy on their websites.  Hedge 
funds provide limited disclosure materials to potential investors after 
investors, either alone or with a purchaser representative, must be sophisticated—that 
is, they must have sufficient knowledge and experience in financial and business 
matters to make them capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective 
investment; 
  Companies must decide what information to give to accredited investors, so long 
as it does not violate the antifraud prohibitions of the federal securities laws. But 
companies must give non-accredited investors disclosure documents that are generally 
the same as those used in registered offerings. If a company provides information to 
accredited investors, it must make this information available to non-accredited 
investors as well; 
  The company must be available to answer questions by prospective purchasers; 
Financial statement requirements are the same as for Rule 505; and 
  Purchasers receive “restricted” securities, meaning that the securities cannot be 
sold for at least a year without registering them. 
Id.  While companies using the Rule 506 exemption do not have to register their 
securities and usually do not have to file reports with the SEC, they must file what is 
known as a “Form D” after they first sell their securities. Form D is a brief notice that 
includes the names and addresses of the company’s owners and stock promoters, but 
contains little other information about the company. Id. 
 131. Securities Act Rule 502(c), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2009); see also Doug 
Cornelius, Advertising or Solicitation to Offer or Sell Securities Under Rule 502(c), 
COMPLIANCEBUILDING.COM, May 12, 2009, http://www.compliancebuilding.com/2009/ 
05/12/advertising-or-solicitation-to-offer-or-sell-securities-occur-under-rule-502c/. 
 132. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2009). 
 133. See Lamp Technologies, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 282988 (May 
29, 1997). The letter establishes that a pre-existing relationship must exist between a 
hedge fund and its investor at least thirty (30) days before the investor may invest in the 
fund. Id. 
 134. See id. at *3, n.8. 
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confirming that the potential investors satisfy the funds investment 
profile. In order to qualify for these exemptions, hedge funds are 
prohibited from advertising to the general public and may only accept 
investment capital from institutional or wealthy accredited investors.  
Perhaps the most important loophole hedge funds exploit is located 
within the Investment Company Act’s definition of an ‘investment 
company.’  Exempt from the Act’s reach are funds with less than one 
hundred investors135 or those available only to “qualified purchasers,” a 
group made up of wealthy or substantial institutional and (often) 
sophisticated investors.136  A hedge fund which falls outside the Act’s 
scope is free to engage in short selling137 and ‘lever up’ the 
investments138  through substantial borrowing, known as ‘leverage.’139  
Such speculative, esoteric and exotic transactions are ‘off-limits’ to 
regulated investment companies.  In addition, hedge funds are exempt 
from the Commodity and Futures Trading Commission’s rules 
governing “commodity pools.”140 
 135. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7)(B)(i) (2006). 
 136. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A) (2006) (defining qualified purchasers as 
individuals who own over $5 million in investments or companies with over $25 
million in investments). 
 137. ROBERT A. JAEGER, ALL ABOUT HEDGE FUNDS: THE EASY WAY TO GET 
STARTED 4-5 (McGraw-Hill 2000) (stating that mutual funds must comply with SEC 
regulations which limit and prohibit certain strategies which hedge funds may engage 
in—such as short selling and over leveraging); see Investopedia.com, supra note 97 
(defining short selling as “[t]he selling of a security that the seller does not own, or any 
sale that is completed by the delivery of a security borrowed by the seller”). 
 138. See David Harper, Hedge Funds Hunt for Upside, Regardless of the Market, 
INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/03/112603.asp. 
 139. See Investopedia.com, Leverage, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/ 
leverage.asp (last visited Sept. 13, 2009) (“[T]he use of various financial instruments or 
borrowed capital, such as margin, to increase the potential return of an investment.”). 
 140. See 17 C.F.R. § 4.5(a)(4) (2009).  The CFTC rule exempts commodity pools 
that sell only to sophisticated participants defined as “accredited investors under 
Regulation D” or “qualified purchasers under the Investment Company Act.” See U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Commodity Pool Operator and Commodity 
Trading Advisor Exemptions and Exclusions, available at http://www.cftc.gov/ 
industryoversight/intermediaries/cpoctaexemptionsexclusions.html.  Hedge funds 
further avoid regulation under Employee Retirement Income Security ACT (“ERISA”), 
because hedge funds limit the ownership interests that an employee benefits plan may 
possess to less than 25% of the fund, thereby avoiding regulation.  29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-
101(f)(1) (2009). See also Hedge Fund Law Blog, Overview of Issues Related to 
ERISA Hedge Fund Investments (Oct. 27, 2008), http://www.hedgefundlawblog.com/ 
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Hedge funds are indirectly regulated through federal laws 
governing banks, insurance companies and broker-dealers from whom 
the hedge funds trade and borrow.  U.S. Treasury Department 
regulations limit the ability of banks to lend to hedge funds by limiting 
the amount of money that banks may lend to hedge funds as a 
percentage of the hedge fund’s total assets.141  Banks must comply with 
minimum, risk-based capital reserves under the Basel Capital Accord, 
and they are subject to inspection and examination by bank examiners 
who determine if a bank’s risk is over-extended.142 These capital 
reserves requirements and risk assessment analysis are designed to limit 
the amount of money that banks may lend to hedge funds, as well as the 
potential risks to which banks may be exposed as result of their 
investment or transactions hedge funds. 
Despite their pervasive presence in the financial services industry, 
hedge funds are completely dependent upon other entities for their very 
existence. In fact, they depend almost entirely on regulated companies 
overview-of-issues-related-to-erisa-hedge-fund-investments.html. 
 141. See 12 C.F.R. § 32.3(a) (2009). This statute provides, in relevant part, that a 
bank may not lend more than 15% of its asset value to any one borrower. Id. Banks may 
mark an additional 10% of its capital to one borrower if the additional funds are secured 
by readily marketable collateral which is statutorily defined as an asset that is fairly 
liquid or exchange traded. Id.; see also 12 C.F.R. § 32.2(n) (2009). 
 142. See generally Bank for International Settlements, Basel II: Revised 
International Capital Framework, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm (last visited Sept. 
14, 2009).  After the implosion of Long-Term Capital Management, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision issued recommendations on managing counterparty 
risk. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANKS’ INTERACTIONS WITH 
HIGHLY LEVERAGED INSTITUTIONS: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BASEL COMMITTEE’S 
SOUND PRACTICES PAPER (2000).  Additionally, the Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors, the SEC, and the U.S. Department of Treasury, and a working group of 
twelve major banks (including Bankers Trust, Bear Stearns, Chase Manhattan, Goldman 
Sachs, Deutsche Bank, J.P. Morgan, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, 
Dean Witter, and Solomon Smith Barney) formed a Counterparty Risk Management 
Policy Group (“CRPG”) to analyze hedge funds impact on the markets. See 
COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT POLICY GROUP, IMPROVING COUNTERPARTY RISK 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICE (1999).  The CRPG issued a similar set of recommendations 
on managing counter-party risk when dealing with hedge funds. Id.  The CRPG’s 
recommendations were incorporated in the Federal Reserve Supervisory Guidance and 
Examination Procedures. See FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, BASEL I 
AND THE EVOLUTION OF CAPITAL REGULATION:  MOVING FORWARD, LOOKING BACK 
(2003). 
2009 HEDGE FUND FRAUD 51 
AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 
 
for vital services, such as investment banking, prime brokerage,143 
insurance and lending. Additionally, investment banks and broker-dealer 
firms often prime brokerage services to hedge funds. 
Prime brokerage services were created to meet the needs of the 
hedge fund industry because hedge funds where unable to enter and 
clear large trading transactions on their own. Not surprisingly, a number 
of large investment banks and broker-dealers sought to meet hedge 
funds’ needs by serving as prime brokers in exchange for handsome 
fees. As investment banks and broker-dealers discovered the amount of 
money that hedge funds were generating from their transactions, many 
investment banking and broker-dealers seduced by the extraordinary 
returns that hedge funds were generating, established hedge fund 
subsidiaries of their own. These hedge fund subsidiaries did not need to 
comply with federal regulations to which their parents were subject.144  
As such, bank-owned hedge fund subsidiaries were liberated from U.S. 
Treasury Department regulations, Federal Reserve Board lending 
restrictions, and Basel Capital Reserve requirements. The current 
financial crisis can in relevant part be traced to the development of bank-
owned investment hedge funds that provided liquidity and/or securitized 
sub-prime mortgaged-backed securities. 
Fortunately, federal securities laws do not exempt hedge funds from 
anti-fraud provision of the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, or state 
securities anti-fraud laws such as New York State’s Martin Act. The 
Securities Exchange Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5 and the insider-trading 
prohibitions promulgated thereunder145 also apply to hedge funds. 
Hedge funds may not make any false or materially misleading 
 143. “Prime Brokerage Services” are defined as a special group of services that 
many brokerages give to special clients. The services provided under prime brokering 
are securities lending, leveraged trade executions, and cash management, among other 
things. Prime brokerage services are provided by most of the large brokers, such as 
Goldman Sachs, Paine Webber, and Morgan Stanley Dean Witter. Hedge funds were 
what started the prime brokerage option. Hedge funds placed large trades and need 
special attention from brokerages. Investopedia.com, Prime Brokerage Services, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/primebrokerage.asp (last visited Sept. 18, 2009). 
See also Richard R. Lindsey, Tips for Choosing a Prime Broker (Bear Stearns Securities 
Corp.), available at http://www.globalclearing.com/gcsportal/pdf/tips_primebroker.pdf. 
 144. See Investopedia.com, Shadow Banking System, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/s/shadow-banking-system.asp (last visited Sept. 18, 2009) (stating hedge-fund 
intermediaries of banks are not regulated). 
 145. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009). 
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statements regarding their investments.146  The Exchange Act requires 
publicly traded companies to report “nontrivial” positions held in off-
balance sheet entities with the SEC147 and report on quarterly basis 
investments of $100 million or more invested in off-balance sheet 
entities.148  Furthermore, the Investment Advisers Act deems hedge fund 
managers to be legal fiduciaries.149  As a legal fiduciary, hedge fund 
managers must place the interest of the hedge fund, and investors of the 
hedge fund, before their own personal int
Nonetheless, some hedge funds engaged in questionable, and 
sometimes fraudulent, transactions which harmed investors or the 
general public.150  The line between questionable and fraudulent conduct 
within the context of the federal securities or common law is blurry. The 
key question is does an overly zealous hedge fund manager’s promise of 
an outrageously high return to investors rise to the level of 
misrepresentation and fraud?151  Some cases, such Bayou Capital, which 
failed in 2004, are clearly within the realm of fraud.  Bayou’s principals 
disappeared, leaving investors with significant losses.152  Eventually, 
 146. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1) (2006). 
 147. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13(f)(1) (2009); see also Shadab, supra note 74, at 1-2. 
 148. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13(f)(1) (2009); see also Shadab, supra note 74, at 1-2. The 
Exchange Act provides, in relevant part: 
Every institutional investment manager which exercises investment discretion with 
respect to accounts holding section 13(f) securities, as defined in paragraph (c) of this 
section, having an aggregate fair market value on the last trading day of any month of 
any calendar year of at least $100,000,000 shall file a report on Form 13F (§ 249.325 
of this Chapter) with the Commission within 45 days after the last day of such 
calendar year and within 45 days after the last day of each of the first three calendar 
quarters of the subsequent calendar year. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.13(f)(1)(a)(1) (2009). 
 149. See Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,299, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,714, 74,716 n.22 (Dec. 
24, 2003). 
 150. See generally GARY WEISS, WALL STREET VERSUS AMERICA THE RAMPANT 
GREED AND DISHONESTY THAT IMPERIL YOUR INVESTMENTS (Portfolio 2006) 
(describing the various techniques that the financial industry, including hedge funds use 
to prey on small investors). 
 151. Will Shanley, Police Arrest 3 for Alleged Hedge Fund Fraud, DENVER POST, 
May 17, 2006, at C01 (stating that two men were arrested for defrauding investors of 
approximately $7.5 million—the investors were mesmerized by the false promise of big 
returns). 
 152. Gretchen Morgenson, What Really Happened at Bayou, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 
2005, at C1. 
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some of the principals were apprehended, and pled guilty to conspiracy 
and fraud charges.153  The 2003 civil charges filed by Spitzer against 
Canary Capital Partners, LLC arguably, arose from fraudulent conduct 
as well. The New York Attorney General’s complaint alleged the 
Canary funds late trading and market timing mutual fund shares was 
fraudulent and illegal.154  These actions breached the trust of Canary’s 
investors, who were unaware their capital facilitated such conduct. 
Instances such as Bayou and Canary raise questions about the legitimacy 
of hedge funds’ complex trading strategies.  They also fuel skeptics’ 
suspicions hedge funds’ purported aversion to disclosing “proprietary” 
trading strategies is, in fact, a cover for more sinister activity.155 
During the past decade many hedge funds have posted phenomenal 
returns.156  These returns, however, are arguably attributable to the fact 
hedge funds were exempt from federal regulation and free engage in 
questionable trading practices unavailable to other market participants. It 
is unfortunate no substantive congressional hedge fund regulatory 
proposals emerged until the current financial disaster.  Perhaps Professor 
Karmel’s argument is correct: 
. . .in the absence of a new crisis involving derivatives, excessive 
leverage in the market or manipulative activities by institutional 
investors, it is unlikely that Congress, the SEC or any other financial 
regulator will decide to study and reform institutional investors’ 
behavior.157 
It is as if Congress had learnt nothing from the Long Term Capital 
Management158 and Enron159 debacles.  The reevaluation of the wisdom 
 153. Hedge Fund Founder, CFO Plead Guilty in Fraud Case, Losses Estimated at 
$450 Million in Bayou Scandal, CHICAGO TRIB., Sept. 30, 2005, at C3. 
 154. Complaint, New York v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC (Sept. 3, 2003), 
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2003/sep/canary_complaint.pdf 
[hereinafter Canary Complaint]. 
 155. See Daniel L. Liffman, Registration of Hedge Fund Advisers Under the 
Investment Advisers Act, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 214 (2005) (arguing that the increase 
popularity of hedge funds have a direct correlation to increase in fraud, whish hurts 
small investors and negatively impacts the markets). 
 156. But see text accompanying notes 99-102, supra. 
 157. See Karmel, supra note 78, at 948, and accompanying text. 
 158. Long Term Capital Management was a hedge started in 1994 with much 
fanfare about its technical trading strategies.  It had two Nobel laureates in economics 
on its board—Robert Merton and Myron Scholes.  It maintained a 28-to-1 leverage of 
its portfolio.  Long Term imploded in 1998 by losing approximately $2.3 billion in a 
matter of months. See id. 
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of unfettered markets prompted by the recent financial crisis presents 
Congress with a wonderful opportunity to adopt clear unambiguous 
hedge fund regulation.  Reformative and preventative measures are 
necessary to adequately protect American investors. 
Until recently, a laissez faire160 trend permeated discussions about 
hedge fund regulation.  Former SEC Chairman Cox testified before 
Congress that “to the maximum extent possible, our actions regarding 
hedge fund regulation should be non-intrusive.”161  While President of 
the New York Federal Reserve, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner 
stated that hedge funds should be regulated.162  This laissez faire attitude 
is all the more alarming when considered in the light of the financial 
implosions of Long-Term Capital and Enron. True to form, the 
aftermath of Enron led Congress to adopt Sarbanes-Oxley163 to protect 
against bad corporate governance and to reassure investors that it was 
 159. Enron began in 1985 as a company that shipped natural gas through pipelines, 
but it changed in the next sixteen years to one of the nation’s most dominant energy 
traders. BBC, Enron Timeline, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/ 
business/2002/enron/timeline/default.stm. Enron allegedly dealt in illegal, off-the-
balance-sheet transactions and partnerships, which allowed the company to conceal its 
growing debt problem. See Complaint, SEC v. Fastow, Civil Action No. H-02-3666 
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2002). Enron high-level executives may have known about the 
company’s financial issues and woes for some time. Former Vice President for 
Corporate Development Sherron Watkins warned Enron’s Chief Executive Officer of 
impending financial problems based on a number of accounting scandals in August 
2001. Financial Collapse of Enron Corp.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight 
& Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 108th Cong. (Feb. 14, 2002) 
(statement of Sherron Watkins, Vice President of Corporate Development, Enron 
Corp.). 
 160. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 981 (4th ed. 
2000). 
 161. Regulation of Hedge Funds: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, & Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Christopher Cox, 
Chairman, SEC) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2006/ 
ts072506cc.htm) [hereinafter Cox Statement]. 
 162. See J. Bradford DeLong’s Grasping Reality with All Eight Tentacles, 
http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2007/07/regulating-hedg.html (July 24, 2007, 21:29 
PST). 
 163. The official title of the bill is “An Act to protect investors by improving the 
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, 
and for other purposes.” Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 
745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C, 15 U.S.C., 18 
U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C.). 
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safe to invest.164 
 
III.  FEDERAL REGULATORS’ CONCERN REGARDING  
CERTAIN HEDGE FUND ACTIVITY 
Markets would. . ..possibly cease to function. 
—William J. McDonough165 
Federal regulators’ authority is not absolute. The SEC166 is limited 
to the authority granted to it under the Securities Act,167 the Securities 
Exchange Act,168 the Investment Company Act,169 the Investment 
Advisers Act,170 and the Rules promulgated thereunder. Likewise, the 
CFTC171 authority is limited to the powers granted to it under the 
Commodities Exchange Act172 and the Rules promulgated thereunder. 
The Federal Reserve Board’s173 power is limited to the authority granted 
 164. 149 CONG. REC. S12976 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 2003) (statement of Rep. Levin) (to 
restore trust in the financial markets after the Enron “debacle”). Sarbanes-Oxley is a 
broad package of federal legislation intended to rein in corporate executives run amok 
and restores investor confidence. Unlike most of the federal initiatives that preceded it, 
Sarbanes-Oxley established some mandatory rules governing the internal affairs of 
publicly listed corporations. In particular, Sarbanes-Oxley includes changes to many 
different areas of the law: (1) accounting and auditing procedures, (2) financial 
disclosures, (3) corporate tax law, (4) securities law, and (5) bankruptcy law. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s goal is to guarantee “trust in the financial markets by ensuring that 
the corporate fraud and greed may be better detected, prevented and prosecuted” and to 
“ensure that such greed does not succeed.”  See S. REP. NO. 107-146 (2002), 2002 WL 
863249, at *2 (statement of Senator Leahy) [hereinafter Leahy Statement] (stating that 
the Act is intended to restore trust in the financial markets after the Enron “debacle”). 
 165. Hedge Fund Operations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking & 
Financial Services, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of William J. McDonough, 
President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York). 
 166. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 167. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77aa (2006). 
 168. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78oo (2006). 
 169. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2006). 
 170. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-22 (2006). 
 171. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 172. Commodities Exchange Act of 1936, 7 U.S.C. § 15 (2006). 
 173. The Federal Reserve System serves as the nation’s central bank.  The System 
consists of a seven member Board of Governors with headquarters in Washington, 
D.C., and twelve Reserve Banks located in major cities throughout the United States.  
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 question. 
to it under Federal Reserve Act174 and the Rules promulgated 
thereunder. The enormous impact of hedge funds’ activities on the 
equity and financial markets calls the wisdom of such restrictions on 
regulators’ authority into
A.  Hedge Fund Growth and Public Investors 
An enormous swath of Americans is indirectly exposed to hedge 
fund investments as beneficiaries of pension funds or institutional 
endowments.  Large public pension funds, such as CALPERS,175 and 
private pension funds, like Harvard’s Sowood Management,176 invest in 
hedge funds either directly or indirectly. CALPERS and Sowood 
Management are institutional investors as defined under the Securities 
Act.177  CALPERS and Sowood Management invest on behalf of 
millions of working-class Americans, who depend on the performance 
of the instutitions’ investments to fund their retirement. 
Unsurprisingly, the SEC promulgated a package of new rules in 
 
Primary responsibility of the Board members is the formulation of monetary policy.  
The Board sets reserve requirements and shares the responsibility with the Reserve 
Banks for discount rate policy.  These two functions plus open market operations 
constitute the monetary policy tools of the Federal Reserve System. In addition to 
monetary policy responsibilities, the Federal Reserve Board has regulatory and 
supervisory responsibilities over banks that are members of the System, bank holding 
companies, international banking facilities in the United States, Edge Act and 
agreement corporations, foreign activities of member banks, and the U.S. activities of 
foreign-owned banks.  The Board is also responsible for the development and 
administration of regulations that implement major federal laws governing consumer 
credit such as the Truth in Lending Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act and the Truth in Savings Act. See Federal Reserve Board, The 
Structure of the Federal Reserve System, http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/frseries/ 
frseri.htm. 
 174. See generally 12 U.S.C. ch.3. 
 175. The California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) is a defined 
benefit retirement plan that manages pension and health benefits for approximately 1.5 
million California public employees, retirees, and their families. CalPERS provide 
benefits based on a member’s years of service, age, and highest compensation. Benefits 
are also provided for disability and death.  CalPERS, Facts at a Glance: General (Oct. 
10, 2009), http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/facts/general.pdf. 
 176. See Jenny Strasburg & Katherine Burton, Sowood Funds Lose More Than 50% 
as Debt Markets Fall (Update 4), BLOOMBERG, July 31, 2007, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=a5He2yClHjJE. 
 177. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b-(a)(15)(i) (2006). 
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2004 to regulate the hedge fund industry.178 The proposed rules 
recognized hedge funds’ outsized impact on the securities industry.179  
Larger hedge funds would become subject to the Investment Advisers 
Act.180 Congress held extensive hearings and roundtable discussions 
with state regulators to determine whether the proposed hedge fund rule 
was adequate.181 In adopting this new hedge fund rule in 2005, the SEC 
extended its oversight over the $1.5 trillion hedge fund industry.182 
The proposed hedge fund rule required all qualifying hedge funds 
to meet the registration requirements by February 1, 2006.  The 
proposed hedge fund rule attempted to amend hedge fund’ advisers 
method of counting that allowed hedge fund advisers to fall within the 
scope of the “private adviser exemption” under the Investment Adviser 
Act.183  Traditionally, the Investment Adviser Act exempted investment 
advisers who had fifteen clients or less counted within the hedge fund 
entity itself.184  In essence, an investment adviser could have 499 
individual investors in a hedge fund but not be required to register 
because the investment adviser was advising only “one client” - the 
hedge fund.185  However, the moment a hedge fund had 500 investors 
(which it rarely did); it was required to register with the SEC.  
Additionally, hedge fund advisers whose principal offices and places of 
business were within the United States, and who managed at least $25 
 178. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Funds Advisers, 
Investment Advisers Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) 
[hereinafter Hedge Fund Rule]. 
 179. See generally Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, SEC, Address at the 
Hedgeworld Fund Services Conference: Hedge Fund Regulation on the Horizon—
Don’t Shoot the Messenger (June 18, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/speech/2009/spch061809laa.htm). 
 180. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-3. 
 181. See Hedge Funds and Capital Markets: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Capital Markets, Insurance & Investment Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing. & Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 8 (2006) (statement of Randal Quarles, 
Undersecretary for Domestic Finance) (stating that the Treasury Department will 
examine in detail whether the growth of hedge funds holds the potential to change the 
overall level or nature of risk in our markets). 
 182. Michael Steinhardt, Do You Really Need a Hedge Fund?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 
2006, at A16. 
 183. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1, 80b-3(b)(1) to (b)(6) (2006). 
 184. See § 80b-3(b)(3). 
 185. See id. 
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million in assets, were required to register with the SEC.186  This was a 
marked change from the SEC’s previous rule exempting investment 
advisers from registering with the SEC, if the adviser managed no more 
than $25 million of a fund that was located within the United States.187 
Additionally, the proposed hedge fund rule created a “look 
through” provision, which required hedge fund advisers to count each 
individual owner of a private fund as a client for purposes of 
determining whether the private adviser exemption applied.  As such, a 
hedge fund that had more than fourteen investors in the previous twelve 
months would no longer qualify for a private adviser exemption, and 
would need to register with the SEC.  Previously, the Investment 
Adviser Act exempted entities that had “fewer than fifteen clients” from 
registering with the SEC.188 Most investment advisers to hedge funds 
were exempt from the requirements of the Investment Adviser Act 
because the advisers intentionally limited their advisory services to less 
than 15 clients. Under the proposed hedge fund rule most hedge fund 
advisers would have to register with the SEC if the funds they advises 
had fifteen or more individual “shareholders, limited partners, members, 
or beneficiaries.”189 
Additionally, the SEC noted that pension funds that invest in hedge 
funds have a fiduciary duty to ensure that pensioners’ investments are 
not placed at risk through reckless investments.190 Fiduciary duty is the 
fundamental hallmark of any relationship in which trust is the 
cornerstone of the relationship. In reliance upon such trust, the fiduciary 
is entrusted with the financial care giving of another. Certainly, pension’ 
funds fiduciary duties required them to conduct appropriate due 
diligence inquiries about the types of investment strategies used by a 
hedge fund.  This must be a prerequisite to a pension fund manager 
making an investment in a hedge fund.  However, a question arises as to 
whether hedge funds provide adequate disclosure to allow pension fund 
manager to adequately satisfy their fiduciary duties. 
 
 186. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a)(1)(A). 
 187. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(1). 
 188. See id. § 80b-3(b)(3). 
 189. 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2(a) (2009). 
 190. See, e.g., AM. JUR. 2D Pensions and Retirement Funds § 454 (1988). 
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B.  SEC Attempt to Regulate Hedge Funds 
The SEC offered several rationales for regulating hedge funds.  
First, the SEC cited the exponential growth of hedge funds industry as a 
basis for adopting hedge fund regulation. At the time there were 
approximately 8,350 active hedge funds that control $875 billion in 
assets.191 The hedge fund industry had experienced capital inflows of 
approximately $126.5 billion in 2006.192  Hedge fund capital inflow 
accounted for “$16.4 billion dollars in the first quarter of 2008.”193  In 
2006 alone, nearly 2,000 new hedge funds began operation.194  The 
inverse is also true, however.  Many hedge funds shut down without 
providing their investors with any notice.195  In 2005, nearly 600 hedge 
funds failed.196 The impact of a hedge fund’s failure on its investors can 
be fatal especially when the investor is a pension fund comprised of 
retirement savings. 
Such fears about the risks to average investors proved justified.  
Hedge funds’ trading strategies did not result in sufficient profit to fulfill 
their existing or future trading obligations, and created a substantial 
burden on hedge funds’ trading counter-parties to fulfill.  Counterparties 
are almost always publicly-traded companies, which must either absorb 
the loss, or default on the existing or future trading obligations.  It is a 
financial domino effect — as one hedge fund fails or defaults on existing 
trading obligation, its creates defaults with counter-parties, which causes 
defaults with other counter-parties with trading contracts. As such, 
hedge fund failures create cross-defaults,197 in the financial and 
 
 191. See id. 
 192. See Aaron Siegel, Hedge Funds Rake in $126.5 Billion, INVESTMENT NEWS, 
Jan. 17, 2007 (stating that hedge fund inflows for the quarter were $15.8 billion that 
brought in a record $126.5 billion for the year). 
 193. Posting to DaveManuel.com, http://www.davemanuel.com/2008/09/03/hedge-
fund-capital-inflows-have-slowed-to-a-trickle-in-2008/ (Sept. 13, 2009, 23:41 EST). 
 194. Cox Statement, supra note 163, at 8. 
 195. See generally The Hedge Fund Implode-O-Meter, http://hf-
implode.com/imploded.html (listing of hedge funds that have imploded since late 
2006). 
 196. Hedge Fund Realities, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2007, at A18. 
 197. Investopedia.com, Cross Default, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cross 
default.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2009) (defining cross-defaults or cross acceleration as 
“provisions in a bond indenture or loan agreement that puts the borrower in default if 
the borrower defaults on another obligation”). 
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securities markets which, in turn, create market liquidity198 problems or 
market credit199 complications. This is why hedge funds have such a 
significant impact on the financial and securities markets. For example, 
the current financial crisis that began in October 2008 can trace its 
origins to the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.200  The 
inability of regulators to ascertain the true state of Lehman’s finances, in 
light of the uncertain value of the bank’s extensive holdings of esoteric 
derivatives contracts and counterparty liabilities impeded their efforts to 
rescue the firm.  Ultimately all investors and the entire global economy 
suffered devastating losses, at least in part, because hedge fund style 
trading instruments were so interconnected with the broader economy. 
The second reason the SEC offered for adopting hedge fund 
regulation was the correlation of significant growth and allegation of 
fraud by hedge fund investors and subsequent hedge fund enforcement 
actions commenced by the SEC and a number of state securities 
regulators.201 Enforcement actions increased against hedge funds 
because hedge funds began to impact the securities and financial 
markets. The impact was felt both in terms of hedge fund failures, and 
the growing number of unsophisticated investors who were able to 
invest in hedge funds. As previously noted in this article, hedge fund 
failures created significant ripple effects in the markets because of the 
cross-defaults, liquidity and credit crunches their failure triggered. The 
unsophisticated investor is in danger because hedge fund advisers 
 198. Investorwords.com, Liquidity, http://www.investorwords.com/2837/liquidity. 
html (last visited Oct. 12, 2009) (defining liquidity as the “ability of an asset to be 
converted into cash quickly and without any price discount”). 
 199. Investorwords.com, Credit, http://www.investorwords.com/1193/credit.html 
(last visited Oct. 12, 2009) (defining credit as the “borrowing capacity of an individual 
or company”). 
 200. See, e.g., Justin Fox, The Bailout’s Biggest Flaw, TIME, Sept. 28, 2009, at 44; 
David Ellis, Lehman Brothers Collapse Stuns Global Markets, CNN.COM, Sept. 15, 
2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/09/15/lehman.merrill.stocks.turmoil/ 
index.html; Posting of Lydie Nadia Cabrera Pierre-Louis to Corporate Justice Blog, 
http://corporatejusticeblog.blogspot.com/2009/09/remembering-lehman-on-eve-of-
first.html (Sept. 8, 2009 16:32 EST). 
 201. See, e.g., Jeffrey Robins & Steven Lofchie, Regulation of Private Funds (May 
1, 2008), available at http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/article/050108LofchieRobins 
RegPriv.pdf (“As the number of hedge funds have grown, so has the number of reported 
cases of frauds on investors.”).  Included in the state regulation enforcement actions are 
the actions commenced by the former Office of the New York State Attorney General, 
Eliot Spitzer. See id. 
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defrauded both hedge fund investors and non-hedge fund investors in 
amounts exceeding approximately $2 billion.202 
The third reason the SEC offered for adopting hedge fund 
regulation was the growing and sizable number of small investors, 
pensioners and others charitable organizations which were indirectly 
investing in hedge funds.  Small investor involvement was increasing 
because hedge funds were expanding their marketing to attract them. 
The hedge funds attracted small investors by decreasing the minimum 
investment requirements. Hedge funds offered diversified investment 
options in a fund of funds.203 A fund of funds is a portfolio of 
uncorrelated hedge funds, bundled together to provide access to a 
variety of hedge funds with different investment styles, strategies and 
risks. The fund of funds may also be a pension fund, foundation, 
university or other charitable organizations that invests in hedge 
funds.204  The danger was that the retirement monies of small investors 
were exposed to exponential risk, possibly leading to sizeable losses, 
which may not have been properly disclosed to the pension fund 
investors.  The SEC’s proposed hedge fund rule sought to remove the 
secrecy by which hedge funds operated.  Once subjected to federal 
disclosure requirement, hedge funds would have to register with the 
SEC, submit to discretionary SEC examinations, and the SEC would be 
permitted to conduct background investigation of hedge fund advisers to 
reveal prior criminal convictions and professional misconduct.205 
C.  Legal Challenge to Proposed Hedge Fund Rule 
In 2006, Phillip Goldstein, the President of Kimball & Winthrop, 
 
 202. See Hedge Fund Rule, supra note 180, at 72,056-75 (stating that complex 
trading strategies takes advantage of the gap in the federal regulation). 
 203. See id. at 72,057. 
 204. SEC, Hedge Funds, http://www.sec.gov/answers/hedge.htm (last visited Oct. 
12, 2009) (defining a fund of hedge funds as “an investment company that invests in 
hedge funds—rather than investing in individual securities. Some funds of hedge funds 
register their securities with the SEC.  These funds of hedge funds must provide 
investors with a prospectus and must file certain reports quarterly with the SEC.”). 
 205. See Hedge Fund Rule, supra note 178, at 72,078 (providing that the 
Commission may screen the adviser and associated individuals, and deny registration if 
they have been convicted of a felony or otherwise have a prior disciplinary record 
subjecting them to disqualification). 
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Inc. challenged the SEC proposed hedge fund registration rule206 in 
court.  The SEC proposed hedge fund rule altered the manner in which 
investment advisors counted their clients. Before the SEC proposed a 
hedge fund registration rule, hedge fund advisers did not have to register 
with the SEC if they had fewer than fifteen clients. The proposed change 
in regulation meant that hedge fund managers would be required to 
count each investor in a hedge fund, rather than counting only the fund 
itself as the client. The ability to count only the fund as the client, 
instead of each individual investor in the fund, allowed hedge funds 
advisers to stay within the fewer than fifteen client rule.207 
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit invalidated the SEC 
proposed hedge fund registration rule.208  Judge Randolph, writing for a 
unanimous panel, held that the SEC re-definition of the term “client” 
was arbitrary, rendering the definition inapposite to the SEC previously 
promulgated safe harbor rule, and conflicted with the purpose of the 
Investment Adviser Act.209  The SEC argued that determining whether 
the proposed hedge fund rule’s use of the term “client” was ambiguous 
triggered the deferential standard outlined by the Supreme Court in 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.210  The 
court rejected the SEC argument, stating that SEC’s construction of the 
term “client” was unreasonable in light of the court’s own interpretation 
of the word, the Investment Adviser Act’s definition of the term 
“investment adviser,” and the SEC’s prior definition of the term “client” 
in the safe harbor rule.211 
Goldstein, emboldened by his court victory, requested an SEC 
exemption for Kimball & Winthrop, Inc. from a proposed rule which 
would require hedge fund advisers with over $100 million under 
management to disclose their equity positions on a quarterly basis.212 
Goldstein believed that his firm’s equity positions were intellectual 
 206. See id. at 72,054. 
 207. Isaac Ruiz-Carus et al., What Is a Hedge Fund?, University of Iowa Center for 
International Finance and Development, available at http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/ 
faq/Hedge.shtml. 
 208. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 209. Id. at 879 & n.5. 
 210. Id. at 878. 
 211. Id. at 879 & n.5 (finding that the safe harbor rule defined “client” as “the 
limited partnership,” itself not the individual partners who invest in the limited 
partnership). 
 212. See Scannell et al., supra note 82. 
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property that should be protected under federal law rather than disclosed 
under it.213 Federal disclosure requirement for mutual funds currently 
mandates that mutual funds disclose their top five portfolio holdings to 
their investors at least on a biannual basis.214 
The court’s ruling in Goldstein v. SEC was incorrect.  The 
Goldstein court’s refusal to accept the SEC argument regarding the 
Supreme Court’s deferential treatment of agency decision-making, 
adopted in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.,215 conflicts with the purpose of the Investment Advisers Act.  
Perhaps more troubling, is the Goldstein Court’s refusal to adapt its 
jurisprudence to a more flexible adaptive rule-making framework that is 
unique to the financial services industry— where the risk of loss, which 
is often shifted onto the unsuspecting public, is enormous.  The financial 
institutions such as banks, insurance companies who execute trades with 
hedge funds, often have the financial wherewithal to withstand the 
financial fallout when a hedge funds defaults on trade transactions, 
which may ultimately lead the hedge fund to fail. However, the 
pensioner who indirectly invest in hedge funds do not have the financial 
wherewithal to withstand such financial fallout when hedge funds 
default on trade transactions and, often pensioners are left holding the 
proverbial bag.  How federal regulators protect should small investors in 
this type of financial quagmire will require innovative regulatory 
techniques and expansive scope of current federal financial reporting 
requirements to capture hedge fund activity in the markets. 
The SEC declined to appeal the Goldstein decision. 
Senator Charles Grassley’s (R-IA), the former ranking Republican 
on the Senate Finance Committee, criticized the SEC for not 
aggressively trying to root out potential for illegal insider trading by 
hedge funds, rather than proposing a new net worth rule.216  Grassley, 
 213. See id. 
 214. Enhanced Disclosure and New Prospectus Delivery Option for Registered 
Open-End Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8861, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 28,064, 72 Fed. Reg. 67,790 (proposed Nov. 21, 
2007).  However, concerns raised by the mutual fund industry regarding the need to 
protect a fund and its shareholders from predatory trading that may occur given the 
concentration of certain funds in fewer issuers convinced the SEC to leave holdings 
disclosure unchanged in the final rule. See id. 
 215. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 216. Brody Mullins & Kara Scannell, Politics and Economics: Hedge Funds 
Coming of Age Politically—Politicians’ Growing Scrutiny Coincides with Calls for 
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disappointed with Goldstein court’s ruling, attempted to reinstate a 
registration requirement for hedge fund advisers with the SEC but his 
attempt was unsuccessful.217  It would take Congress three years to re-
consider proposed legislation to directly regulate hedge funds.218 
The adverse outcome of Goldstein, at first, appeared to dampen the 
SEC’s resolve to regulate the hedge fund industry.  This sentiment was 
compounded when the hedge fund industry responded to the decision by 
withdrawing their registration applications from the SEC en masse.  
Backing away from an entirely new regime, the SEC tweaked the old 
requirements. 
The Commission promulgated revised anti-fraud rules, instead.  In a 
move which the SEC estimated would reduce the number of hedge fund 
investors by 88%,219 the Commission increased the net worth 
requirement for hedge fund investors.220  It also clarified disclosure 
requirements applicable to registered and unregistered investment 
advisers to hedge funds and other private investment pools.221  The 
proposed net worth rule makes it unlawful for an investment adviser, 
irrespective of its registration status under the Investment Advisers Act 
to “make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact . . . to any investor or prospective investor in a pooled 
investment vehicle.”222  The new anti-fraud rule also prohibits hedge 
Cash; Will New PAC Provide Cover?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2007, at A6. 
 217. David M. Katz, Sen. Grassley Seeks Hedge-Fund Rule, CFO.COM, Mar. 8, 
2007, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/8834476/c_8913455?f=insidecfo. 
 218. Posting of Zachery Kouwe to Dealbook Blog, Senators Seek to Regulate Hedge 
Funds, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/29/senators-seek-to-regulate-hedge-
funds (Jan. 28, 2009, 18:53 EST).  The proposed legislation is aptly titled, Hedge Fund 
Transparency Act of 2009.  On July 16, 2009, the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs held a hearing entitled Regulating Hedge Funds and Other 
Private Investment Pools to discuss legislation that would require all hedge fund 
advisers and the advisers of private equity and venture capital funds to register with the 
SEC.  President Obama’s administration has also submitted proposed legislation to 
regulate hedge funds titled Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009. 
See id. 
 219. 17 C.F.R. § 206(4)-8(a)(1) (2009). 
 220. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; 
Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, Securities Act Release No. 
8766, Investment Advisers Act No. 2576, 72 Fed. Reg. 400 (proposed Jan. 4, 2007) 
(Proposed Regulation § 206(4)-8). 
 221. See 17 C.F.R. § 206(4)-8(a)(1). 
 222. Id. § 206(4)-8(a)(1). Compare the language of the general antifraud rule under 
2009 HEDGE FUND FRAUD 65 
AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 
 
funds from engaging in deceptive or manipulative practices.223 
The new regulation is much broader in scope than the 10b-5 general 
antifraud rule because it applies even when the statement, omission or 
deceptive practice does not accompany the purchase or sale of an 
interest in the pooled investment vehicle or any other security.224 
Conceptually, this would pull questionable conducts that previously 
were outside the scope of 10b-5 anti-fraud rule within its scope.  For 
example a questionable strategy that hedge funds employ is to publish 
negative research reports225 which they distribute to the public to create 
negative impression of the financial viability and management of 
targeted publicly-traded companies with AAA credit rating that they 
have shorted and against whom hedge funds have purchased substantial 
amounts of credit default swaps.  Hedge funds target these publicly-
publicly traded companies because these companies are the most 
vulnerable to negative news.  The stock prices of these targeted 
companies can move almost instantaneously based upon such 
unsubstantiated widely dispersed negative news. 
IV. CERTAIN HEDGE FUND ACTIVITY NEGATIVELY  
AFFECTS THE PUBLIC GOOD 
Hell, there are no rules here—we’re trying to accomplish something. 
—Thomas A. Edison226 
 
Disclosure and transparency are critical to the balanced operation of 
the markets.  The current modus operandi of hedge fund non-disclosure 
can lead to eminent implosion of the hedge fund industry.227  The 
principle purpose of financial regulation is to protect the investing public 
from fraud by requiring publicly traded companies to provide adequate 
the Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009). 
 223. 17 C.F.R. § 206(4)-8(a)(2). 
 224. Id. § 206(4)-8; see discussion of enforcement action in Securities Act Release 
No. 8766, supra note 222. 
 225. See infra Section V.B. 
 226. LANCE SECRETAN, INSPIRE! WHAT GREAT LEADERS DO 30 (John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc. 2004). 
 227. See Joseph Nocera, Offering Up an Even Dozen Odds and Ends, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 24, 2005, at C1 (stating that secrecy is the biggest problem with the hedge fund 
industry). 
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disclosure through financial reporting regulation such as annual reports, 
quarterly reports and other public disclosure filings with the SEC.228 The 
secondary purpose of financial regulation is to protect the investing 
public from the agency costs associated with the delegation of 
investment services and/or decisions to third parties.  Investors should 
be confident securities’ markets are operated to ensure all participants 
are treated fairly.  Regulation exists to ensure the integrity of the 
marketplace.229  American investors have come to expect this parens 
patriae230 role that government has assumed to protect and serve. 
Hedge funds’ operations, culture and strategy are antithetical to this 
tradition.  The hedge fund industry is a closely knit group.231  They all 
seem to know each other or know about each other.232  Hedge funds are 
not known for readily revealing their investment strategies, positions, 
 228. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2006).  The SEC describes its 
function as promoting and facilitating investor access to essential investment related 
information by “promoting the disclosure of important market-related information, 
maintaining fair dealing, and protecting against fraud.” See Investor’s Advocate, supra 
note 11; see, e.g., DANIEL REINGOLD & JENNIFER REINGOLD, CONFESSIONS OF A WALL 
STREET ANALYST: A TRUE STORY OF INSIDE INFORMATION AND CORRUPTION IN THE 
STOCK MARKET (2006) (exposing the illegal use of insider information on Wall Street). 
 229. See David Skeel, Behind the Hedge, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Dec. 2005, at 28 (Dec. 
2005) (arguing that the basic integrity of the market, and investment of million of 
Americans who think they have nothing to do with hedge funds will be in danger, as 
long as the need to take unreasonable risks, and show large returns continues to be 
expected from the investing public). 
 230. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (9th ed. 2009) (defining parens patriae as “a 
doctrine by which a government has standing to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a 
citizen, especially on behalf of someone who is under a legal disability to prosecute the 
suit”). 
 231. Riva D. Atlas, Hedge Fund Rumors Rattle Markets, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2005, 
at C2 (stating that the secrecy of hedge funds makes a number of investors nervous). 
 232. See generally David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Corporate Governance: 
Advice on Coping with Hedge Fund Activism, N.Y. L.J., May 25, 2006, at 5 (stating that 
when one hedge fund takes a position in a company, other hedge funds will buy stock 
shortly thereafter.  When hedge funds act in concert, their behavior is referred to as a 
“wolf pack” approach.); see also Andrew Kulpa & Butzel Long, The Wolf in 
Shareholder’s Clothing:  Hedge Fund Use of Cooperative Game Theory and Voting 
Structures to Exploit Corporate Control and Governance, 6 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 78, 
97-100 (2005) (arguing that cooperative behavior among hedge funds allows hedge 
funds to attack companies in packs; several hedge funds may combine their voting 
power to exert governance over a firm or corporation). 
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profits or losses.233  The proprietary trading strategies that they utilize, 
each with its own risk level and potential return signature, are not 
revealed to the investors, competitors or regulators.234  The secrecy of 
hedge funds’ operations prompted Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben 
Bernanke to describe hedge funds as opaque—in that hedge funds do not 
have to disclose their trading strategies to anyone and rely heavily on 
secrecy, speed, and leverage to be profitable.235 
C. Questionable Investment Strategies Impact Markets 
Federal regulators are concerned about the investment funds that 
invest in hedge funds—typically called funds of funds.236  Funds of 
funds usually invest in from fifteen to twenty-five hedge funds at a 
time.237  Funds of funds are defined by their registration status.238  
 
 233. See Joseph Nocera, Offering Up an Even Dozen Odds and Ends, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 24, 2005, at C1 (stating that it is scary that nobody knows what hedge funds are 
doing or how much they are leveraged; it conjures up visions of Long-Term Capital 
Management, which put a huge scare into the financial system when it blew up in the 
late 1990s). 
 234. The author had a rare opportunity as a New York State Assistant Attorney 
General to interview and depose several hedge funds regarding the legitimacy of certain 
research and trading activities.  The information gleaned from those interviews and 
depositions have been invaluable to my understanding of the inner workings of the 
hedge fund world and the trading strategies in which hedge funds engage. 
 235. Benjamin Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the Fed. Reserve 
Bank of Atlanta’s 2006 Financial Markets Conference (May 16, 2006) (transcript 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/ 
bernanke20060516a.htm. 
 236. Investorwords.com, Funds of Funds, http://www.investorwords.com/2129/ 
fund_of_funds.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2009) (describing a funds of funds as a fund 
that invests in other funds). 
Just as a mutual fund invests in a number of different securities, a fund of funds holds 
shares of many different mutual funds. These funds were designed to achieve even 
greater diversification than traditional mutual funds. On the downside, expense fees 
on fund of funds are typically higher than those on regular funds because they include 
part of the expense fees charged by the underlying funds. In addition, since a fund of 
funds buys many different funds which themselves invest in many different stocks, it 
is possible for the fund of funds to own the same stock through several different funds 
and it can be difficult to keep track of the overall holdings. 
Id. 
 237. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 83, at 67. 
 238. See generally William Fung & David A. Hsieh, A Primer on Hedge Funds, 6 J. 
EMPIRICAL FIN. 303 (1999) (discussing how hedge funds are organized). 
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Commonly three types of fund of funds exist:(1) dual-registered funds, 
which are registered as the Securities Act; (2) ‘40 Act registered, which 
are registered under the Investment Company Act and make private 
placement offerings,239 and (3) institutional funds, which are only 
offered to institutional investors.240  Federal regulators have a growing 
concern about funds of funds availability to small investors via mutual 
funds.241  Funds of funds usually charge a performance fee.  As such, all 
funds of funds investors must be qualified investors under the Securities 
Act, Rule 205-3.242 
The SEC has expressed concern regarding the lack of disclosure 
that funds of funds provide potential investors, and the limited 
disclosure provided to existing investors.243  The SEC is particularly 
concerned about the double and sometimes triple layer of fees that 
investors are required to pay.244  Typically, registered funds of funds pay 
a series of layered fees: (1) a management fee to the investment adviser 
of 1-2 percent of total assets under management, (2) a performance fee 
up to 20% of capital appreciation, and (3) the underlying hedge fund 
also pays similar investment fees.245  Funds of funds do not disclose to 
their investors the actual or even the estimated fees incurred.246 In 
addition to not disclosing their layered fees, funds of funds do not 
disclose their investment positions.247  Registered funds of funds must 
disclose their financial statements and positions to investors in semi-
 239. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2009). 
 240. Hedge Fund Rule, supra note 178, at 72,057. 
 241. Id. (stating that over 50 funds of funds mutual funds intend to offer shares to 
the public, in part, because there are no minimum initial investment requirements for 
investors of funds of funds with registered investment advisers). 
 242. Rule 205-3 provides, in relevant part, that each investor must have a net worth 
of at least $1.5 million or have at least $750,000 of assets under management with the 
adviser. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,064 (Dec. 10, 
2004). 
 243. Lisa Whitehouse, Corporate Social Responsibility: Views from the Frontline, 
63 J. BUS. ETHICS 279 (2006). 
 244. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 81, at 100. 
 245. See id. at ix. 
 246. 17 C.F.R. § 274.11a-1 (2009). 
 247. See Fund of Funds Investments, Securities Act Release No. 8297, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26,198, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,226 (proposed June 24, 2004) 
(proposing an amendment to Form N-22). 
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annual reports.248  However, funds of funds only disclose the underlying 
hedge funds in which they have invested, they do not reveal the actual 
portfolio holdings in which the underlying hedge funds have invested.249  
Additionally, registered funds of funds must disclose their overall 
investment strategy and valuation information of a fund of funds’ 
positions in an underlying hedge fund’s portfolio holdings.250 
Despite the amazing growth in the hedge fund industry, investors 
have begun to witness a certain level of the hedge fund implosion that 
may be similar to Long-Term Capital Management’s failure, which 
required a bailout by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and several 
major New York banks.251  This is evidenced by the failure of Amaranth 
Advisors,252 Bailey Coates Cromwell Fund,253 and Sowood Capital 
Management, a hedge fund started by former Harvard University money 
managers that lost $350 million in July 2007, and was forced to sell its 
portfolio and return $1.5 billion to investors.254 
Hedge funds engage in primarily three types of investment 
strategies:  (1) directional investing,255 (2) corporate event-driven 
investing,256 and (3) arbitrage.257  Basically, directional investing seeks 
to profit from price gains or declines in specific markets by simply 
purchasing a security when investors believe that it is going up, and 
selling a security when investors believe that the security is going 
down.258  These are not complicated strategies but they are profitable. 
 248. 17 C.F.R. § 270.30e-1 (2009). 
 249. Fung & Hsieh, supra note 238, at 299-300. 
 250. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 81, at 92, 99. 
 251. See Moody’s Sees Potential for Big Hedge Fund Failure, REUTERS, Aug. 16, 
2007. 
 252. See Ann Davis et al., What Went Wrong at Amaranth—Mistakes at the Hedge 
Fund Include Key Trader’s Confusing Paper Gains with Cash Profits, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 20, 2006, at C1. 
 253. Jim McWhinney, Massive Hedge Fund Failures, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, Nov. 17, 
2005, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/mutualfund/05/HedgeFundFailure.asp?& 
viewed=1=1&viewed=1. 
 254. Christopher Rowland, How a Hedge Fund Star Lost It All, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
16, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/16/business/worldbusiness/16iht-hedge. 
4.7145437.html?_r=1. 
 255. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 81, at 58; see also Fung & Hsieh, supra 
note 238. 
 256. Fung & Hsieh, supra note 238. 
 257. See Shadab, supra note 74, at 38. 
 258. Investopedia.com, Directional Trading, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/ 
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Corporate event-driven investing seeks to profit from events like 
mergers or bankruptcies. Arbitrage seeks to profit from inefficient price 
discrepancies in the various markets such as the Asian markets in 
comparison to the European market or the American market.259  In 
addition, to these three main investing strategies, thirty percent of hedge 
funds employ an equity long-short strategy, which is a mechanism by 
which standard stocks are hedged against the volatility of the equity 
position losing value by short-selling.260 The strategy is basically to sell 
short the same security by betting that the value of the same asset class 
will decrease over a relatively short period of time. 
1.  Short Selling 
Short-selling or shorting has a contentious global history.  
Napoleon Bonaparte declared short-selling tantamount to treason 
because it interfered with his ability to finance his military efforts.261 
During World War I, the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”)262 
 
directionaltrading.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2009) (defining directional trading as a 
“strategy used by investors [that utilizes] open positions, either long or short, on the 
belief that they are able to correctly predict the movement of price in a security”). 
 259. See Shadab, supra note 74, at 38. 
 260. SEC, Short Sale, http://www.sec.gov/answers/shortsale.htm (last visited Oct. 
12, 2009) (defining a short sale as the sale of a security that the seller does not own or 
that the seller owns but does not deliver).  In order to deliver the security to the 
purchaser, the short seller will borrow the security, typically from a broker-dealer or an 
institutional investor. The short seller later closes out the position by returning the 
security to the lender, typically by purchasing equivalent securities on the open market. 
In general, short selling is utilized to profit from an expected downward price 
movement, or to hedge the risk of a long position in the same security or in a related 
security. See id.; ROBERT A. JAEGER, ALL ABOUT HEDGE FUNDS 4-5 (McGraw-Hill 
2000). 
 261. TOM TAULLI, WHAT IS SHORT SELLING? 2 (2004). 
 262. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) traces its origins to 1792, when 24 
New York City stockbrokers and merchants signed the Buttonwood Agreement.  This 
agreement set in motion the NYSE’s unwavering commitment to investors and issuers.  
Originally called the “curb market” because its brokers traded outdoors in the street, the 
Amex has been at the forefront of the U.S. financial markets over the course of two 
centuries.  The historic combination of NYSE Group and Euronext in 2007 marked a 
milestone for global financial markets. It brought together major marketplaces across 
Europe and the United States whose histories stretch back more than four centuries.  
The combination was by far the largest of its kind and the first to create a truly global 
marketplace group.  Today NYSE Euronext welcomes the historic American Stock 
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implemented short-selling regulations for the first time in American 
history because of the fear that the German Kaiser263 would short the 
American markets triggering a financial disruption of the American 
securities and financial markets.264 Short selling has had a catastrophic 
impact on the securities and financial markets, and has led historically to 
economic turmoil, such as the Great Depression265 and the current 
financial recession. In 1917, the NYSE was authorized to regulate short-
selling.266 
Currently, short-selling is still perceived as a behavioral economics 
matter that may need government regulation in order to be controlled.  
Certain countries have gone even further and implemented corporal 
punishment to deter short-selling.  For example, in 1995, the Malaysian 
Finance Ministry proposed that short-selling be punished by caning.267 
Exchange into the world’s largest and most liquid exchange group. NYSE Euronext, 
History, http://www.nyse.com/about/history/1089312755484.html. 
 263. FRANK J. FABOZZI, SHORT SELLING: STRATEGIES, RISKS, AND REWARDS 183 
(2004). 
 264. It is interesting that many political and corporate commentators believe that the 
October 2008 American financial collapse was in part largely due to hedge funds 
shorting the financial service companies. 
 265. Beginning in 1929 and lasting until about 1939, the Great Depression was an 
economic slump that affected North America, Europe, and other industrialized areas of 
the world. See Modern American Poetry, About the Great Depression, 
http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/depression/about.htm.  
The Great Depression was the longest and most severe depression ever experienced 
by the industrialized Western world. Though the U.S. economy had gone into 
depression six months earlier, the Great Depression may be said to have begun with a 
catastrophic collapse of stock-market prices on the New York Stock Exchange in 
October 1929. During the next three years stock prices in the United States continued 
to fall, until by late 1932 they had dropped to only about 20 percent of their value in 
1929. Besides ruining many thousands of individual investors, this precipitous decline 
in the value of assets greatly strained banks and other financial institutions, 
particularly those holding stocks in their portfolios. Many banks were consequently 
forced into insolvency; by 1933, 11,000 of the United States’ 25,000 banks had failed. 
The failure of so many banks, combined with a general and nationwide loss of 
confidence in the economy, led to much-reduced levels of spending and demand and 
hence of production, thus aggravating the downward spiral. The result was drastically 
falling output and drastically rising unemployment; by 1932, U.S. manufacturing 
output had fallen to 54 percent of its 1929 level, and unemployment had risen to 
between 12 and 15 million workers, or 25-30 percent of the work force.  
Id. 
 266. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(a) (2006). 
 267. TAULLI, supra note 261, at 6. 
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As late as 2001, approximately ten countries prohibited short-selling.268 
In fall 2008, due to the financial collapse in the markets, the SEC issued 
a temporary ban on short sales of 799 financial stocks to stop traders 
who sought to profit from the financial crisis by betting against bank 
shares. The temporary emergency action was designed to protect the 
integrity and quality of the securities market and strengthen investor 
confidence.269 
The question then becomes why is short-selling viewed as such a 
despised trading tactic?  The answer, in part, is human nature—that is, it 
is natural to dislike people that benefit at the misfortune of others, which 
is precisely what short-sellers do—they make money when assets 
decline in value or when companies do not perform well.270 There is 
something almost un-American with regard to short-selling. It seems 
almost un-American to bet on the decrease of an asset or company’s 
value. Shorting is a phenomenon that has taken the securities industry by 
storm. Hedge funds have made fortunes by utilizing this mechanism.271  
Certain commentators have observed that hedge funds that use the short-
selling trading technique frequently manipulate the market to obtain 
their desired decrease in a targeted company’s stock price by publishing 
false negative research reports and simultaneously encouraging 
reputable business reporters to publish investigative reports exposing a 
targeted company’s impending financial ruin.272 What is often not 
revealed is that investigative business news articles written by the 
reputable business reporters are to a large extent, based on data supplied 
to the reporters by hedge funds, primarily the negative research report.273 
There is evidence to support an issue that has been raised fairly 
often regarding hedge funds’ attempts to manipulate the market. Some 
 268. Arturo Bris et al., Efficiency and the Bear: Short Sales and Markets Around the 
World 31-32 (Yale ICF Working Paper No. 02-45, 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/hedge-efficiency.pdf. 
 269. Vikas Bajaj & Graham Bowley, S.E.C. Temporarily Blocks Short Sales of 
Financial Stocks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008, at B1. 
 270. See FABOZZI, supra note 263, at 184; TAULLI, supra note 261, at 9. 
 271. The question should not be whether hedge funds should use this trading 
technique.  The question should be “how” do hedge funds manage to consistently 
employ shorting techniques that statistically beat the average.  How do they do it?  How 
do they know that the market will take a downturn with respect to one stock versus 
another? 
 272. TAULLI, supra note 261, at 5. 
 273. Id. 
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commentators argue that hedge funds, in particular, those that primarily 
engage in short selling, frequently engage in market manipulation.274 
Nonetheless some commentators argue that short-selling is beneficial to 
the market because it eliminates market over-pricing.275 They further 
argue that federal regulation should not be amended to subject hedge 
funds to the same rules against shorting to which mutual funds must 
comply.276 Traditionally, mutual funds are prohibited from utilizing 
derivatives to avoid margin requirements established by the Federal 
Reserve Board’s Regulation T, which requires a margin of 50% on short 
sales and long positions in a stock.277  Hedge funds do not have such 
short selling constraints imposed upon their trading activity. As such, 
they are able use short-selling combinations to make very sophisticated 
long/short trade combinations based upon a hedge funds’ prediction of 
price movements in the markets.278 
2.  Massive Derivatives Losses and Liquidity Problems 
In addition to the risks associated with derivatives trading, the 
hedge fund industry has additional risks that are particular only to hedge 
funds which include: (1) systemic risk, (2) contagion, (3) fund failure, 
and (4) extreme leverage. Many commentators trading believe that 
derivatives are extremely risky investments,279 especially given the 
 
 274. See Sherry M. Shore, SEC Hedge Fund Regulatory Implications on Asian 
Emerging Markets: Bottom Line or Bust, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 563, 577 
(2005). 
 275. Edward M. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion, 32 J. FIN. 
1151, 1154 (1977). 
 276. Charles M. Jones & Owen A. Lamont, Short Sale Constraints and Stock 
Returns, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 221 (2002); see also The Long and Short of Hedge 
Funds: Effects of Strategies for Managing Market Risks:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Capital Markets, 108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of Owen A. Lamont, Associate 
Professor of Finance, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago) (stating that 
270 companies that attacked short sellers had returns that lagged the market by 42% 
over the following three years). 
 277. 12 C.F.R. § 220.18 (2009). 
 278. See WILLIAM J. CREREND, FUNDAMENTALS OF HEDGE FUND INVESTING 1 
(1998). 
 279. Lydie Nadia Cabrera Pierre-Louis, Controlling a Financial Jurassic Park: 
Obtaining Jurisdiction over Derivatives by Regulating Illegal Foreign Currency Boiler 
Rooms, 8 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 35 (2007); Miguel A. Segoviano & Manmohan Singh, 
Counterparty Risk in the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market (Int’l Monetary Fund, 
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highly publicized massive derivative losses arising from situations such 
as Orange County, California’s bankruptcy280 and Long-Term Capital 
Management’s federal bailout.281  Warren Buffet once referred to 
derivatives as  “financial weapons of mass destruction.”282  Ironically, 
properly employed derivatives do not present any greater risk than any 
other financial instruments.283 It really depends on the controls that 
management implements to control the risk inherently associated with 
derivatives.  However, management of derivatives is more complex, and 
mis-management has resulted in significant financial losses, which has 
Working Paper No. 08/258, 2008), available at http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/ 
2008/wp08258.pdf; FDIC, Derivatives Risk in Commercial Banking, Mar. 26, 2003, 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2003/032603fyi.html. 
 280. See Timothy A. Canova, The Transformation of U.S. Banking and Finance: 
From Regulated Competition to Free-Market Receivership, 60 BROOKLYN L. REV. 
1295, 1348 (1995) (stating that Orange County’s bankruptcy, which led to major 
reduction in public services for California residents, was part of a larger trend of losses 
experienced by the public sector from derivative investment); Henry T.C. Hu, Illiteracy 
and Intervention: Wholesale Derivatives, Retail Mutual Funds, and the Matter of Asset 
Class, 84 GEO. L.J. 2319, 2326 (1996) (describing the Orange County loss as one which 
“dominate[d] the financial headlines”). 
 281. See Symposium, Crisis in Confidence: Corporate Governance and 
Professional Ethics Post-Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1097, 1107 (2003) [hereinafter 
Crisis in Confidence] (stating that a Federal Reserve bailout of $7 billion dollars for the 
Long Term Capital Investment crisis of 1998 was motivated by a fear of a “crisis in 
confidence” of the American economy); Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates 
Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 
DUKE L.J. 701, 709 (1999) (opining that the “trading disaster” suffered by Long Term 
Capital Management illustrates the risk of derivatives for individual investors, and the 
economy as a whole). 
 282. BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY, 2002 SUMMARY ANNUAL REPORT 13-15 (2003), 
available at http://berkshirehathaway.com/2002ar/2002ar.pdf. 
 283. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, More Than Just “New Financial Bingo”: A Risk-
Based Approach to Understanding Derivatives, 23 IOWA. J. CORP. L. 1, 15 (noting that 
speculators in these transactions embrace risk in order to profit from the fluctuations in 
the price of the derivatives contract and provide liquidity to a market in which traders 
are in direct competition); Joan E. McKown & Anita T. Purcell, Ninth Annual 
Corporate Law Symposium: Securities Regulation: Article: Enforcement Actions 
Involving Derivatives: BT Securities Corp. and Beyond, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 117, 119 
(1996) (asserting that though risky, “derivatives are not bad themselves. When used 
properly, derivatives are valuable tools for managing financial risk. However, the 
occasionally spectacular losses that are associated with derivatives and are reported by 
the media apparently cause some managers to ask why their firms use derivatives and 
lead some people to ‘demonize’ derivatives.”). 
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further resulted in the need for greater federal regulatory control.  There 
are primarily four types of risks associated with derivatives: (1) market 
risk; (2) credit risk; (3) operational risk and (4) legal risk.284 
Some commentators believe that hedge funds benefit the economy 
by: (1) mitigating price downturns, (2) bearing risks that counter-parties 
do not wish to bear, (3) making securities more liquid, (4) scouring 
out/manipulating inefficiencies in the market.  These “benefits” are 
possible because hedge funds are not regulated,285 and can utilize 
derivatives and leverage to impunity without disclosing their strategies 
to the general public or regulators. 
Institutional investors such as banks maintain written policies and 
procedures that identify the risk tolerance of the board of directors, 
which establishes the risk tolerance of the institutional entity engaging in 
the derivatives transactions.  The policies also delineate the lines of 
authority and responsibility for managing the derivatives activities.286  In 
contrast, hedge funds do not maintain any such policies and procedures.  
Furthermore, the small investors that invest in hedge funds via pensions 
funds are unaware and do not understand the derivatives transactions in 
which hedge funds engage.287  Nor are small investors fully aware of all 
policies and procedures that relate to their trading liability that can result 
in massive and unexpected losses.288 
 284. See Joanne Medero, Managing Risk Derivatives—Recent Developments 
Affecting Dealers and End-Users, in 1 27TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES 
REGULATION 412 (PLI Corp. L. Course Handbook Series No. B-907, 1995); see 
generally Edward S. Adams & David E. Runkle, The Easy Case for Derivatives Use: 
Advocating a Corporate Fiduciary Duty to Use Derivatives, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
595, 615-19 (summarizing the risks associated with derivatives). 
 285. Rene M. Stulz, Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future (Fischer Coll. of Bus., 
Working Paper No. 2007-03-003, 2007). 
 286. See David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1312, 1374 (2001) (noting that because derivative dealers cannot always take 
only well compensated risks, major investment banks usually have in place very strict 
risk management policies for derivative transactions); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The 
Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, 
Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 349-50 (2002) (noting 
that the similarities in risk management policies leads to parallel investment strategies 
by institutional investors, causing a potential dearth of liquidity if an adverse shock 
struck the OTC derivatives market). 
 287. April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Hedge Fund Activism (NYU Working Paper No. 
CLB-06-017, 2006). 
 288. Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank for International Settlements, 
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3.  Systemic Risk 
The second type of trading risk particular to the hedge fund industry 
that can lead to widespread failure, which may create the need for 
federal governmental financial bailout, is systemic risk. Federal 
regulators are concerned about the systemic risk that hedge funds pose—
that is, the risk to economic participants beyond hedge fund investors.289  
Systemic risk is the risk that hedge fund losses can, and history has 
shown will, spread to third parties, such as banks and broker-dealers, the 
broader market, and the general public.  Systemic risk is in essence a 
market failure because the third-parties are unaware of their exposure to 
hedge fund losses, and are unable to react to such losses, let alone 
absorb such losses because the same trading activities that create 
fabulous returns for hedge funds (short selling, derivatives trading, and 
arbitrage) all create increased systemic risk for the broader financial 
markets.290 
Perhaps the most infamous example of systemic risk is the collapse 
of Long-Term Capital Management.291  The implosion of Long-Term 
Capital, its subsequent federal bailout, and continuing bankruptcy is a 
lesson that regulators should do well to remember, particularly as 
regulators discuss to what extent hedge funds should be regulated and 
which transactions should remain unregulated. Hedge fund unregulated 
status and access to federal bailout funds to cover their losses is an 
 
Risk Management Guidelines for Derivatives, July 27, 1994, reprinted in Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,410, at 85,557 (Aug. 10, 1994); FUTURES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION 
GLOBAL TASK FORCE ON FINANCIAL INTEGRITY, FINANCIAL INTEGRITY 
RECOMMENDATIONS: FOR FUTURES AND OPTIONS MARKETS AND MARKET 
PARTICIPANTS (1995). 
 289. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Stefan Nagel, Hedge Funds and the Technology 
Bubble, 59 J. FIN. 2013, 2032 (2004). 
 290. Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bank, Address at the Council on 
Foreign Relations: Financial Reform to Address Systemic Risk (Mar. 10, 2009) 
(transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke 
20090310a.htm). 
 291. Crisis in Confidence, supra note 281 (stating that a Federal Reserve bailout of 
$7 billion dollars for the Long Term Capital Investment crisis of 1998 was motivated by 
a fear of a “crisis in confidence” of the American economy); Lynn A. Stout, Why the 
Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC 
Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 791, 709 (1999) (opining that the “trading disaster” suffered 
by Long Term Capital Management illustrates the risk of derivatives for individual 
investors, and the economy as a whole). 
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anomaly in American financial and securities markets.292  In 1998, 
Long-Term Capital predicted that the spreads between the returns on 
bonds of developing and industrialized countries would narrow. The 
prediction was wrong.  Long-Term Capital lost $4.4 billion in a matter 
of weeks. The New York Federal Reserve provided a $7 billion federal 
bailout, because it feared that a default by Long-Term Capital on its 
existing derivative trading contracts would cause a domino default effect 
throughout the U.S. and international securities markets. More than ten 
years later, aspects of Long-Term Capital’s bankruptcy are still in 
litigation.293 
In response to the Long-Term Capital debacle, several major 
commercial and investment banks formed a policy group which issued 
two reports detailing the improvements that the financial sector should 
make to improve risk management.294  After the collapse of Long-Term 
Capital Management, federal regulators conducted a review of the hedge 
fund industry and concluded that if the hedge fund industry was unable 
to absorb its trading losses, the federal government had adequate 
resources to contain the financial risks that hedge fund trading strategies 
would have on the markets.295  The impact on the financial and 
securities markets as result of hedge funds’ inability to cover their 
trading losses resulted in abrupt cessation of trading,296  completely 
 292. See Riva D. Atlas, Hedge Fund Rumors Rattle Markets, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 
2005, at C2 (stating that the secrecy of hedge funds as well as the collapse of Long 
Term Capital Management have made a number of investors uneasy); Eric Altbach, The 
Asian Crisis and the IMF: After the Deluge, The Debate, 17 JAPAN ECON. INST. REP., 
May 1, 1998, http://www.jei.org/Reports/JEIR/98JEIRsummaries/s9817.html (stating 
that bailouts by the institutions such as the International Monetary Fund encourages 
hedge fund irresponsibility and propagate financial crisis because lenders act fully 
knowing that the IMF will absorb their losses). 
 293. Joseph G. Haubrich, Some Lessons on the Rescue of Long-Term Capital 
Management (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Policy Discussion Paper No. 19, 
2007). 
 294. See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, 
LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (1999), available 
at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S 
WORKING GROUP] (examining the market crisis that the failure of Long Term Capital 
Management precipitated). 
 295. Id. 
 296. See Vikas Agarwal et al., Role of Managerial Incentives and Discretion in 
Hedge Fund Performance (London Business School, Working Paper No. 04-04, 2005); 
Stuart Feffer & Christopher Kundro, Understanding and Mitigating Operational Risk in 
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 lost over several months.299 
disrupting the broader markets, and resulted in catastrophic losses.  For 
example, 1998 Long-Term Capital Management’s failure required a 
consortium of investment banks to bail-out Long-Term Capital 
Management to protect the integrity of the markets.297  In September 
2006, Amaranth Advisors suffered the largest collapse in hedge fund 
industry, losing an estimated $6.6 billion in natural gas trades in a few 
weeks.298  Amaranth lost one-third more money in a few weeks than 
Long-Term Capital
4.  Contagion 
The third type of trading risk particular to the hedge fund industry 
that can lead to widespread failure, which may create the need for 
federal governmental financial bailout, is contagion.300  We move, 
therefore, beyond the Long-Term Capital model of a single fund 
imploding, to the systemic failure of several funds collapsing at the same 
time, and the resulting domino default effect that will undoubtedly send 
shockwaves throughout the world’s economy.301  The likelihood of 
contagion occurring is not as far fetched as we think.  For example, it 
may begin as simple as one hedge fund experiencing liquidity risk, and 
therefore selling its investments at a major loss because of its need for 
cash.  The hedge fund’s losses spread to the lender that loaned the hedge 
fund money to make the investments that it surreptitiously dumped, (the 
lender is now unable to recover the money lent to the defaulting hedge 
 
Hedge Fund Investments (Capco White Paper, 2003). 
 297. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 81 (relating story of growth and collapse of long 
term capital markets).  See also Crisis in Confidence, supra note 281, at 1107 (stating 
that a Federal Reserve bailout of $7 billion dollars for the Long Term Capital 
Investment crisis of 1998 was motivated by a fear of a “crisis in confidence” of the 
financial economy). 
 298. Steven Mufson, Hedge Fund’s Collapse Met with a Shrug: Amaranth’s Loss in 
Natural Gas Gamble Not Seen as Affecting Broader Market, WASH. POST, Sept. 20 
2006, at D01; Ludwig B. Chincarini, Natural Gas Futures and Spread Position Risk: 
Lessons from the Collapse of Amaranth Advisors L.L.C. (Working Paper Series, 2008); 
see SCOTT FRUSH, HEDGE FUNDS DEMYSTIFIED (2008). 
 299. See Shadab, supra note 74, at 36. 
 300. See generally Nicole Boyson et al., supra note 93 (finding “find strong 
evidence of contagion across hedge fund styles, so that hedge fund styles tend to have 
poor coincident returns”). 
 301. See ROBERT F. BRUNER & SEAN D. CARR, THE PANIC OF 1907: LESSONS 
LEARNED FROM THE MARKET’S PERFECT STORM (2009). 
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fund), and to the counter-parties on the other side of the trading contract 
(who may not be able to absorb the unexpected losses of the defaulting 
hedge fund).302 
Continuing with our hypothetical, let’s take the hypothetical a little 
further. Imagine if you will that numerous hedge funds made the same 
investment—a common hedge fund strategy known as herding.303  Let’s 
further presume that the hedge funds’ investment went bad (a likely 
occurrence), and they are all forced to sell their positions at a major loss 
(the ever present liquidity risk).  As in our previous example, the hedge 
funds’ losses are spread to the lenders that loaned the hedge funds 
money to make the investments that they surreptitiously dumped, (the 
lenders are now unable to recover the monies lent to the defaulting 
hedge funds), and to the counter-parties on the other side of the trading 
contracts (who may not be able to absorb the unexpected losses of the 
defaulting hedge funds).  This multiplier effect would have a devastating 
effect on the U.S. and world economies. 
  
5.  Excessively or Highly-Leveraged Transactions 
The fourth type of risk particular to the hedge fund industry is their 
continuous engagement in excessively or highly leveraged transactions.  
Leverage can be simply defined as the ability to lose or make more than 
the initial invested amount because of the ability to borrow against the 
invested amount or use derivatives to make additional investments.304 
 
 302. At the time that the author developed this hypothetical in March 2007, it was 
18 months prior to Lehman Brother’s collapse and the current financial crisis. 
 303. See Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy & Natural Resources, 110th 
Cong. 15 (2008) (written testimony of Jeffrey Harris, Chief Economist, Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission) (defining herding as the propensity of various market 
participants to be trading on the same side of the market concurrently).  Although many 
rules govern the behavior of individual traders, the CFTC recognizes that concurrent 
trading by groups of traders—“herds”—can detrimentally affect markets. Herding 
behavior can represent an impediment to the efficient functioning of markets if market 
participants follow the herd blindly, causing prices to over-adjust to new information. 
Herding typically occurs only when prices were falling and price increases were 
unrelated to herding activity. See id. 
 304. See InvestorWords.com, Leverage, http://www.investorwords.com/2786/ 
leverage.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).  Leverage is defined as: 
The degree to which an investor or business is utilizing borrowed money. Companies 
that are highly leveraged may be at risk of bankruptcy if they are unable to make 
80 FORDHAM JOURNAL  Vol. XV 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
Excessive leverage or highly leveraged can be defined as significant 
borrowing or utilization of derivatives to finance investments, which 
magnify losses to such a multiple that the borrower is unable to pay the 
losses and is likely to file for bankruptcy.305 
There are no limits to a hedge fund’s ability to use leverage,306 
except for those limits imposed by a hedge fund’s lender and counter-
party.307 Banks, in particular, are subject to risk-capital regulations that 
provide the minimum capital requirements based upon the risk prototype 
of the underlying asset, which includes loans to and trades with hedge 
funds.308  The majority of hedge funds borrow heavily309 because the 
borrowed funds provide the much needed capital to execute the complex 
and extremely risky trades.  The investment strategies in which hedge 
funds engage require a great deal of capital.  For example, hedge funds 
that engage in arbitrage trades need much more capital than those that 
engage in shareholder activism.  Most hedge funds are leveraged 2 to 1 
payments on their debt; they may also be unable to find new lenders in the future. 
Leverage is not always bad, however; it can increase the shareholders’ return on their 
investment and often there are tax advantages associated with borrowing. 
Id. 
 305. See InvestorWords.com, Highly Leveraged Transaction, http://www.investor 
words.com/7151/highly_leveraged_transaction.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2009) 
(defining a highly leveraged transaction as a loan made to a financial institution that 
already has a large amount of debt).  “The large amount of pre-existing debt means that 
the company is already leveraged, so additional debt can increase the risk of bankruptcy 
if the company is unable to make interest payments.” Id.  See Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge 
Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 681 (2000) (discussing how hedge 
funds’ excessive use of leverage can result in huge profits or huge losses, which will 
spill over into the financial market and the securities market as well); Shawn Tully, End 
of Wall Street as We Know It:  Financial Firms Have Relied on a Highly Flawed 
Business Model for Years, FORTUNE, Mar. 17, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/17/ 
magazines/fortune/investing/Tully_WallStIsBroken.fortune/index.htm. 
 306. See PRESIDENT’SWORKING GROUP, supra note 294. 
 307. See id. at 5.  Hedge funds carte blanche towards leverage is restrained only by 
the willingness and ability of lenders and counterparties extend credit and funds to 
hedge funds.  Broker-dealers that lend to hedge funds must comply with the margin 
requirements of Federal Reserve System, Regulation T. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1 to 220.12 
(2009).  Additionally, FINRRA imposes additional maintenance margins.  FINRA Rule 
2520(c)-(d); NYSE Rule 431(c)-(d).  Furthermore banks that lend to hedge funds must 
comply with treasury risk-capital regulations. 12 C.F.R. § 32.3(a) (2009). See id. 
 308. See FDIC, Basel I and the Evolution of Capital Regulation: Moving Forward, 
Looking Back, Jan. 14, 2003, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2003/011403fyi. 
 309. See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 294, at 5. 
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to their investment capital, and some are leveraged as much as 30 to 1 to 
their investment capital.310 
As discussed earlier, hedge fund losses are spread to the lender that 
loaned the hedge fund money to make the investments (the lender is now 
unable to recover the money lent to the defaulting hedge fund), and to 
the counter-parties on the other side of the trading contract (who may 
not be able to absorb the unexpected losses of the defaulting hedge 
fund).  Now let’s take it one step further.  Imagine that numerous hedge 
funds are over-leveraged—a common hedge fund occurrence.  As in our 
previous example, these significant hedge fund losses are spread to the 
lenders, and to the counter-parties who may not be able to absorb the 
unexpected losses of the defaulting hedge funds. Again, this multiplier 
effect would have a devastating effect on the U.S. and world 
economies.311  Regulators and hedge fund industry groups recognize that 
hedge fund risk management has significant challenges, primarily with 
operational risk as a result of derivatives trading.312  Hedge funds 
borrow heavily, and when their trading strategies fail, the huge losses 
are passed on to investors, lenders and trading counter-parties.313  
Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner, when he was President and 
CEO of the New York Federal Reserve, shared certain observations on 
hedge fund leverage and associated risk to the financial markets 
indicates several developments since the collapse of Long-Term Capital 
Management ten years ago: (1) the sheer number of hedge funds has 
increased drastically, (2) lender and counter-party exposure is more 
diversified, (3) lenders and counter-parties have dramatically increased 
their risk management, and (4) banks’ capital relative to risk has 
remained constant.314 From the comments it sounds as the markets have 
 310. See id. 
 311. Robert C. Pozen, Hedge Funds Today: To Regulate or Not?, WALL ST. J., June 
20, 2005, at A14 (noting that collapse of highly leveraged funds will threaten the 
integrity of financial industry). 
 312. See Karmel, supra note 78, at 70 (arguing that in the absence of a new crisis 
involving derivatives, excessive leverage in the market or manipulative activities by 
institutional investors, it is unlikely that Congress, the SEC or any other financial 
regulator will decide to study and reform institutional investors’ behavior). 
 313. See id. 
 314. Timothy F. Geithner, President & CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Keynote 
Address: Hedge Funds and Their Implications for the Financial System (Nov. 17, 2004) 
(transcript available at http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/speeches/2004/gei0411 
17.html). 
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ature 
of their operations. 
V.  HEDGE FUNDS CREATE A ZONE OF MANIPULATIVE SCHEMES 
. . .  It nourishes in o  idleness instead of 
industry and morality . . . . 
 —Thomas Jefferson315 
A.  Hedge Funds Engaging in Late Trading and Market Timing
adapted and can easily absorb any unforeseen crisis.  However, Mr. 
Geithner continued his comments by noting that further improvements 
in risk management by counter-parties and lenders are needed including 
better due diligence and demanding that hedge fund disclose the n
All the capital employed in paper speculation is barren and useless . 
ur citizens habits of vice and
 
The SEC and the U.S. Justice Department317 subsequently announced 
In 2003, based primarily upon the information Noreen Harrington 
provided, the New York Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer reached a $40 
million settlement with Canary Capital Partners, LLC and Canary 
Investment Management, LLC (collectively, “Canary Capital”) and Mr. 
Edward J. Stern, Managing Principal for violations of New York’s 
General Business Law and Executive Law involving arrangements to 
engage in market timing and late trading strategies.316  Subsequently, the 
New York Attorney General and the Massachusetts Secretary of the 
Commonwealth each launched investigations into market timing and late 
trading of shares of registered investment companies (“mutual funds”).  
 
 315. THE JEFFERSONIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 932 (John P. Foley ed., Funk & Wagnalls 
Co. 1900). 
 316. Canary Complaint, supra note 154. 
 317. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, sec. 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92-93 (1789), created the 
Office of the Attorney General. Originally a one-person part-time position, the Attorney 
General was to be “learned in the law” with the duty “to prosecute and conduct all suits 
in the Supreme Court in which the United States shall be concerned, and to give his 
advice and opinion upon questions of law when required by the President of the United 
States, or when requested by the heads of any of the departments, touching any matters 
that may concern their departments.” The workload quickly became too much for one 
person, necessitating the hiring of several assistants for the Attorney General. With an 
increasing amount of work to be done, private attorneys were retained to work on cases. 
In 1870, after the post-Civil War increase in the amount of litigation involving the 
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similar investigations conducted in conjunction with the investigations 
already underway in New York and Massachusetts.318 The New York 
Attorney General’s Office investigated “arrangements”319 between 
mutual funds and certain hedge funds including Canary Capital that 
permitted the hedge funds to engage in market timing and/or late 
trading. The “arrangements” are not per se illegal activities. However, 
“arrangements” entered into by mutual funds with certain hedge fund 
investors that were allowed to market time the purchases of mutual fund 
shares and redemptions of mutual fund shares for maximum profit for 
the hedge funds. 
These “arrangements” contradicted stated mutual fund policies and 
were not disclosed to all mutual fund investors. These “arrangements” 
irrevocably harmed existing mutual fund investors by siphoning profits 
from the other mutual fund investors. The “arrangements” were the 
bases of breach of fiduciary duty claims against the mutual funds’ 
investment advisers and board of directors because of the funds’ 
inconsistent application of fund policies regarding restrictions or 
prohibitions against market timing and/or late trading.  The mutual 
funds’ prospectuses stated that the funds’ attempted to restrict or 
 
United States necessitated the very expensive retention of a large number of private 
attorneys to handle the workload, a concerned Congress passed the Act to Establish the 
Department of Justice, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162 (1870), setting it up as “an executive 
department of the government of the United States” with the Attorney General as its 
head. Officially coming into existence on July 1, 1870, the Department of Justice, 
pursuant to the 1870 Act, was to handle the legal business of the United States. The Act 
gave the Department control over all criminal prosecutions and civil suits in which the 
United States had an interest. In addition, the Act gave the Attorney General and the 
Department control over federal law enforcement. To assist the Attorney General, the 
1870 Act created the Office of the Solicitor General. The 1870 Act is the foundation 
upon which the Department of Justice still rests. However, the structure of the 
Department of Justice has changed over the years, with the addition of the Deputy 
Attorneys General and the formation of the Divisions. Unchanged is the steadily 
increasing workload of the Department. It has become the world’s largest law office 
and the central agency for enforcement of federal laws. 
 318. Recent Commission Activity to Combat Misconduct Relating to Mutual Funds: 
Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Fin. Mgmt., the Budget, & Int’l Sec., Comm. on 
Gov’t Affairs, 108th Cong. (2003) (written testimony of Stephen M. Cutler, Director, 
Division of Enforcement, SEC). 
 319. “Arrangements” were contracts between hedge funds and investment advisers 
to allow hedge funds to have the capacity—permission to time the purchase and 
redemption of particular mutual funds for the maximum profit to the hedge funds. See 
Canary Complaint, supra note 154, at 4, 13. 
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ges or 
invo
tandard for accountability by 
the d
Capital.322  The Nations Funds’ board directors breach of its fiduciary 
discourage market timing and late trading activities (including through 
the imposition of short-term trading penalties, delayed exchan
luntary redemptions).  However, that was far from the truth. 
The complaint provided, in relevant part, that Canary Capital 
engaged in late trading on a daily basis from March 2000 until the New 
York Attorney General’s Office began its investigation in July of 2003. 
During the declining market of 2001 and 2002, Canary Capital used late 
trading to, in effect, sell mutual fund shares short. This caused the 
mutual funds to overpay for their shares as the market went down, 
serving to magnify long-term mutual fund investors’ losses.  The 
investigation targeted dozens of mutual funds but only one hedge fund.  
The complaint further alleged that Canary Capital obtained some of its 
late trading “capacity” directly from one mutual fund manager, Bank of 
American N.A. Bank of America installed special computer equipment 
in Canary’s office that allowed it to buy and sell Bank of America’s 
mutual fund companies, the Nations Funds, and hundreds of other 
mutual funds at the 4:00 P.M. price until as late as 6:30 P.M. EST. In 
return, Canary Capital agreed to leave millions of dollars in Bank of 
America bond funds on a long-term basis as “sticky assets.”320 Based, in 
part on these allegations, Bank of America entered into a settlement 
agreement with the New York State Office of the Attorney General for 
approximately $675 million.  Additionally, the settlement included 
corrective measures designed to set a new s
irectors of mutual fund companies.321 
At the center of the Bank of America story is the Nations Funds’ 
board of directors’ failure to disclose the “arrangements” that it had 
entered into with Canary Capital to the detriment of thousands of 
Nations Funds’ investors. Under a specific provision of the settlement 
agreement, eight members of the board of directors of Nations Funds, 
resigned or otherwise left the board in the course of one year for their 
role in approving a controversial, if not per se illegal measure that 
enabled a hedge fund to conduct company-sanctioned market timing and 
late trading of Bank of America and other mutual funds by Canary 
 
 320. These parked funds are known in the hedge fund industry as “sticky assets.” 
 
aureen O’Hara, The Corporate Governance of Banks, 
Canary Complaint, supra note 154, at 15. 
 321. Jonathan R. Macey & M
9 ECON. POLICY REV. 91 (2003). 
 322. Amy Borrus, A Guide to the Hedge Fund Maze:  Dizzying Growth and an 
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duties by failing to protect the interest, and entering into “arrangement” 
that created a conflict of interest with the mutual fund investors. The 
directors allowed Canary Capital, a favored hedge fund client, to engage 
in late trading and market timing practices that personally harmed 
thousands of mutual fund investors. Bank of America never disclosed its 
“arrangement” with Canary Capital in its filings with the SEC.  Failure 
to disclose such controversial, if not per se illegal activity which falls 
within the materiality requirement of the Securities Exchange Act and 
the rules promulgated thereunder evidences a need for further 
modification and clarification of the disclosure duties of publicly-traded 
companies.323 
B.   Hedge Funds Distributing Negative Research Reports to the Public 
Publication of questionable “research reports” is but one trading 
strategy that hedge funds employ. Hedge funds use a variety of 
investment strategies that are perceived as complex because they involve 
numerous combinations of trades in order to increase the probability of 
the hedge fund making a profitable return.  Many types of investment 
strategies exist, including shorting, merger arbitrage,324 distressed 
 
Absence of Regulation Have Spawned a Series of Scandals, BUS. WEEK ONLINE, Oct. 
19, 2005, http://www.buisnessweek.com/bwdailydnflash/oct2005/nf20051019_1613 
_db016htm (stating hedge funds opposed to increased regulation use their money to 
sman & O.D. Hart, Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids, 35 J. FIN. 
arbitrage.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).  Merger arbitrage is defined as 
fol
the probability of the deal being approved and how long 
, risk arbitrage, 
influence legislators). 
 323. See S.J. Gros
323, 323-34 (1980). 
 324. See Investopedia.com, Merger Arbitrage, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/ 
m/merger
lows. 
A hedge fund strategy in which the stocks of two merging companies are 
simultaneously bought and sold to create a riskless profit. A merger arbitrageur looks 
at the risk that the merger deal will not close on time, or at all. Because of this slight 
uncertainty, the target company’s stock will typically sell at a discount to the price 
that the combined company will have when the merger is closed.  A regular portfolio 
manager may focus only on the profitability of the merged entity. In contrast, merger 
arbitrageurs care only about 
it will take the deal to close. 
Id.; SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 81, at 4. See also IMF, GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
STABILITY REPORT: MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES 45 (2004), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2004/02/index.htm [hereinafter IMF REPORT] 
(listing and defining various hedge fund strategies including shorting, merger arbitrage, 
distresses securities, convertible arbitrage, derivatives, fixed income
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securities,325 convertible arbitrage,326 and derivatives trading327 to name 
a few. Perhaps of the almost exhaustive list of strategic trades that hedge 
funds use, the most infamous are derivatives trading. Regulators have 
been concerned about the derivative trading strategies that hedge funds 
emerging markets, equity hedge, global macro, and sector composite). 
 325. See Investopedia.com, Distressed Securities, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/d/distressedsecurities.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).  Distressed securities are 
defined as follows. 
A financial instrument in a company that is near or is currently going through 
bankruptcy. This usually results from a company’s inability to meet its financial 
obligations. As a result, these financial instruments have suffered a substantial 
reduction in value. Distressed securities can include common and preferred shares, 
bank debt, trade claims (goods owed) and corporate bonds. 
Id.; SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 81, at 35; see also IMF REPORT, supra note 324, at 
52 (defining various hedge fund strategies including shorting, merger arbitrage, 
distresses securities, convertible arbitrage, derivatives, fixed income, risk arbitrage, 
emerging markets, equity hedge, global macro, and sector composite). 
 326. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 81, at 35; Investopedia.com, Convertible 
Arbitrage, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/convertiblearbitrage.asp (last visited 
Oct. 12, 2009) (defining convertible arbitrage as an “investing strategy that involves the 
long position on a convertible security and a short position in its converting common 
stock”); see also IMF REPORT, supra note 324, at 52 (defining various hedge fund 
strategies including shorting, merger arbitrage, distresses securities, convertible 
arbitrage, derivatives, fixed income, risk arbitrage, emerging markets, equity hedge, 
global macro, and sector composite). 
 327. The author was unable to find a definition of the “derivative trading” in any 
financial, economic, or legal literature. Perhaps it is this opaqueness in the derivatives 
industry that compelled Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) to sponsor the Derivatives Trading 
Integrity Act of 2009. Senator Harkin stated that he “believes that Derivatives Trading 
Integrity Act will bring more transparency and accountability into the marketplace.”  
Press Release, Senate Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry Committee, Harkin Measure 
Would Require Openness, Transparency, and Integrity in Swaps and All Futures 
Trading (Nov. 20, 2008), available at http://216.40.253.202/~usscanf/index.php? 
option=com_content&task=view&id=1812&Itemid=2. Specifically, the bill amends the 
Commodity Exchange Act to eliminate the distinction between “excluded” and 
“exempt” commodities and regulated, exchange-traded commodities; futures contracts 
for all commodities would be treated the same. A summary of the bill by Government 
Track provides, in relevant part, that the bill amends the Commodity Exchange Act to: 
“(1) repeal the exemption or exclusion from regulation by the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) of specified derivative transactions, swap transactions, 
and related electronic trading facilities; (2) restrict futures trading to contract markets or 
derivatives transaction execution facilities; and (3) abolish exempt boards of trade.” See 
Govtrack.us, Overview of the Derivatives Trading Integrity Act of 2009, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-272&tab=summary (last visited 
Oct. 12, 2009). 
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employ because of their potential impact on the financial and securities 
markets and, in particularly on small investors.328 Nonetheless, a 
relatively new trading strategy that hedge funds employ commonly 
referred to as “funds of funds”329 has added an additional layer of 
concern for regulators because certain funds of funds are marketed to the 
general public.330 
For short selling to work best in terms of the aggregate return that a 
hedge fund receives by speculating against a targeted company 
performing well, at times a hedge fund may engage in a manipulative 
measures to “create” a scenario where the marketplace perceives a 
targeted company as not performing well. A most effective means that 
hedge funds use to create a negative perception of a targeted company is 
the widespread publication of negative research reports about a targeted 
company to the general public.331  Such hedge funds may spread false 
negative rumors on blogs and various investor chat rooms as well as 
release “research reports” about the company that they have shorted in 
order to create a wide-spread sell-off of the stock by investors which in 
turn drives the stock price down. As such, the hedge funds profit by 
purchasing the stock of the company from panicked investors who are 
desperate to sell the “sinking’ stock.  The hedge funds purchase the 
stock at abnormally low price locking in their predetermined profit.332  
The anti-fraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act Section 10b and 
 328. Michael M. Grynbaum, As Losses Mount, the Fed and the White House Step 
Up Derivatives Trading Is Scrutinized, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2008, at C1. 
 329. SEC, Hedge, http://www.sec.gov/answers/hedge.htm (defining a fund of hedge 
funds as an investment company that invests in hedge funds rather than investing in 
individual securities. Some funds of hedge funds register their securities with the SEC. 
These funds of hedge funds must provide investors with a prospectus and must file 
certain reports quarterly with the SEC). 
 330. Dave Kansas, Making Sense of Wall Street: As Investment Choices Pile Up, 
Grasping Fundamentals Is Key, Hedge Fund Boom Explained, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 
2006, at B1 (describing a fund of funds as pools of money gathered from individuals 
and institutions, which in turn are funneled into a group of hedge funds.  This practice 
has opened the world of hedge funds to new, smaller class of investors). 
 331. New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer’s Office received copies of 
several negative research reports published by hedge funds which targeted public 
companies including Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac), MBIA, 
Inc, and Pre-paid Legal, Inc. 
 332. See DANIEL REINGOLD, CONFESSIONS OF A WALL STREET ANALYST:  A TRUE 
STORY OF INSIDE INFORMATION AND CORRUPTION IN THE STOCK MARKET (2006) 
(describing the manipulative and illegal use of inside information in Wall Street). 
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Rule10b-5333 does not apply because the negative reports are not issued 
in connection with the purchase and sale of a security. The negative 
research reports are not published simultaneously with the purchase or 
sale of security, rather the hedge funds purchase securities weeks and 
months before the negative research reports are published, accumulating 
massive short positions, totaling millions of dollars.334 
To further ensure that the marketplace perceives a targeted 
company in a negative light, prior to the release of the negative research 
reports, the hedge would have slowly accumulated over several months 
a sizable amount of credit default swaps. The purchase of the credit 
default swaps are designed to give the appearance in the marketplace 
that there is concern regarding the targeted company’s financial ability 
to repay its debts and other financial obligations. 
C.  Hedge Funds Purchasing Credit Default Swaps 
The credit-default swaps market is $39 trillion market and has 
operated in the shadows. There is no public disclosure or any legal 
requirement governing these contracts.335  Since there is no necessity to 
report these transactions to the SEC, federal regulators did not have a 
way to assess the amount of risk in the financial system, whether credit-
default swaps have been accurately valued or honestly traded, and 
whether financial institutions issuing and trading credit default swaps 
 
 333. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009), provides in relevant part that: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale 
of any security. 
Id. 
 334. Moorad Choudhry, The Credit Default Swap Basis; How Credit Default Swaps 
Became a Timebomb, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 29, 2008, at 83. 
 335. See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 294, at 25 (discussing no 
systemic risk from such derivatives since “private counterparty discipline”—investors’ 
natural desire to keep their own risks to a minimum—would work to protect the broader 
financial system). 
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have taken on too much risk that threatens unsuspecting investors.336 
Hedge funds purchase credit default swaps, which are insurance 
contracts that cover losses on the insured transaction in the event of a 
default. Credit default swaps were typically purchased to insure 
municipal bond, corporate debt and mortgage securities transactions.337 
Beginning in the late 1990s, hedge funds began to purchase credit 
default swaps in targeted companies that shorted to give the markets the 
misconception that company was experiencing major credit problems.  
The result was a decrease in the stock price of the targeted company due 
to the investing public’s misdirected uncomfort regarding the targeted 
company’s ability to perform and succeed in the market.  Furthermore, 
hedge funds that engage in this type of manipulative practice will 
oftentimes encourage renowned business journalists to write an 
investigative expose of the company’s eminent financial demise further 
feeding the sell-off fervor.338 
Hedge funds often use credit derivatives such as credit default 
swaps to manage the risks to which they are exposed through their 
equity investments by buying credit protection through a credit default 
swap. The current financial meltdown has revealed the extent to which 
regulated financial institutions are intertwined with unregulated hedge 
funds, in particular hedge funds’ purchase of credit default swaps from 
regulated insurance companies to ensure hedge funds’ speculative 
investment. The ability of hedge funds to shift their risk to regulated 
financial institutions if extremely problematic. If the insurance company 
does not have sufficient collateral to  bear the losses that the hedge fund 
has insured, the insurance company will collapse unless it is able to 
reinsure the credit default swap or receive a substantial infusion of 
capital to cover the losses.  This is precisely the unfortunate scenario 
which happened with American International Group.339 
 336. Christopher Cox, Swapping Secrecy for Transparency, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 
2008, at § WK, at 12. 
 337. Janet Morrissey, Credit Default Swaps:  The Next Crisis?, TIME, Mar. 17, 
2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1723152,00.html. 
 338. Interview with Roger Waldman, Senior Enforcement Counsel, Office of the 
New York State Attorney General, Investment Protection Bureau (Jan. 28, 2008) 
(discussing investigative news articles that appeared in the Wall Street Journal, New 
York Times, and other financial news pertaining to Farmer Mac, MBIA, Inc., and Pre-
paid Legal, Inc.). 
 339. American International Group, Inc., About AIG, http://www.aigcorporate.com/ 
aboutaig/index.html. AIG can trace its roots back nearly 100 years when it began as a 
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American International Group (AIG) issued $440 billion in credit-
default swaps. As the real estate market took a precipitous decline AIG 
experienced downgrades in its credit ratings. As a result, holders of the 
credit-default swaps wanted more collateral, which AIG could not 
provide. Credit default swaps originally issued by AIG were widely 
resold in the secondary market. AIG was trapped in an intricate web of 
transactions. These transactions created a systemic risk that contributed 
to a gravitational pull that threatened to pull AIG down under the weight 
of its own financial obligation and would create a financial domino 
effect in AIG’s global insurance business. As such, the U.S. government 
provided AIG with an $85 million rescue package. Based on the impact 
that credit default swaps have on world markets, there is a structural 
evolution currently underway to provide greater transparency and lower 
counter-party risk through the utilization of central counter-parties and 
other practices.340 Congress has proposed legislation to regulate the 
credit default swap transactions.341 
VI.  RECOMMENDATION 
Markets can remain irrational far longer than 
 you or I can remain solvent. 
—John Maynard Keynes342 
The author proposes a hybrid hedge fund governance matrix be 
developed with a three prong regulatory structure to provide required 
varying levels of disclosure and transparency based on the volume, 
small insurance company. See id.  Since that time it has grown to become one of the 
world’s largest companies. See id.  By the end of 2007 “AIG had assets of 
approximately $1 trillion, $110 billion in annual revenues, 74 million customers, and 
116,000 employees in 130 countries and jurisdictions.  Yet, less than a year later, AIG 
found itself on the brink of failure and in need of emergency government assistance.” 
Id. 
 340. Shannon D. Harrington, Credit Swaps To Be Overhauled as Dealers Curb 
Risks (Update 2), BLOOMBERG, Jan. 30, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=20601087&sid=aa1Y8DpE6p1I&refer=home. 
 341. Regulation of credit default swap market would be included in the 
comprehensive Over-The-Counter (OTC) Derivatives Market Act of 2009.  See H.R. 
977, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 342. John Maynard Keynes, Economist and Investor, http://www.maynard 
keynes.org. 
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frequency and potential losses in which particular hedge funds may 
engage or experience. The hybrid hedge fund governance matrix is 
designed to project the potential negative impact that certain hedge fund 
activity may have on the financial and securities markets. Recently 
James Thomson, a Vice President and Financial Economist at the 
Cleveland Federal Reserve Bank, presented an amusing and simple 
drawing board presentation on YouTube, to outline a three-tiered 
regulatory system to determine appropriate regulator response to 
systemically important financial institutions.343 
The first prong is a simple one: all hedge funds must register with 
the SEC and the liability for such failure to register is the automatic 
submission to SEC jurisdiction. This requirement is analogous to the 
CFTC requirement that any person who engages in commodities trading 
transactions on behalf of another must be registered with the CFTC.344  
Required registration with the SEC is not a novel concept.  Recently, the 
SEC attempted to require the largest hedge funds to register with the 
SEC.  As we have discussed in Section V, the Goldstein decision 
vacated the SEC’s authority to require hedge funds to register based 
upon the SEC’s arbitrary and capricious definition of the term “client.”  
The Goldstein decision does not prohibit the SEC from regulating hedge 
funds. It simply prohibits the SEC from arbitrarily re-defining existing 
terms and removing existing definitional safe harbors that certain 
persons have relied on to be exempted from SEC jurisdiction. However, 
it is time that the SEC imposed a new definition. A definition that is as 
simple and expansive as the CFTC definition as to whom must register 
with, and be subject to, CFTC jurisdiction. The SEC may require that 
any person who is not already subject to other federal regulation and 
 343. James Thomson, What To Do About Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions (Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland Policy Discussion Paper No. 27, 2009), 
available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/topics/finstability/three_tier_risk/. 
 344. Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6(d) (2006).  The Commodities 
Exchange Act provides in relevant part, that: 
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to engage as futures commission merchant or 
introducing broker in soliciting orders or accepting orders for the purchase or sale of 
any commodity for future delivery, or involving any contracts of sale of any 
commodity for future delivery, on or subject to the rules of any contract market or 
derivatives transaction execution facility unless— 
(1) such person shall have registered, under this chapter, with the Commission as 
such futures commission merchant or introducing broker and such registration shall 
not have expired nor been suspended nor revoked. 
Id. 
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engaged in “hedging activity”345 on behalf of another must be registered 
with the SEC. Such a broad definition would bring within SEC 
jurisdiction hedge fund activity that poses the greatest threat to the 
stability of the financial and securities markets. 
The second prong requires registered hedge funds to disclose to the 
SEC investment strategies, holdings, and potential risks associated with 
certain hedge fund activity. This requirement is analogous to the mutual 
fund disclosure requirement that compels mutual funds to reveal their 10 
largest portfolio holdings on a 30-day delayed cycle.346 
The third prong also requires publicly-traded companies to disclose 
their exposure to hedge funds347 and other significantly leveraged 
entities.348  The purpose of the rule would be to bring hedge funds that 
traditionally transact with publicly-traded companies within the zone of 
disclosure required under the Securities Exchange Act that all material 
information is provided to investors and the general public. Currently, 
publicly-traded companies disclose on a limited basis their exposure to 
hedge funds primarily through the purchase of credit default swaps349 to 
protect themselves from counter-party risks.  However, publicly-traded 
companies do not provide detailed disclosure of their risk exposure to 
hedge fund counter-party trades, financing and investing as part of their 
periodic reporting duties under the Securities Exchange Act. These types 
of private, inadequately disclosed transactions by publicly traded 
 345. “Hedging activity” is a term that should be defined by the SEC to include all of 
the known forms of transactions in which hedge fund engage including short selling, 
excessive borrowing, derivatives trading and publication of negative research reports to 
the general public.  The list of activity cannot by definition be a finite one given the 
innovative nature of the hedge fund industry. 
 346. Disclosure of each mutual fund’s complete holdings is required to be made 
quarterly within 60 days of the end of each fiscal quarter (currently, each January 31, 
April 30, July 31, and October 31) in the Annual Report and Semi-Annual Report to 
Fund shareholders and in the quarterly holdings report on Form N-Q. 
 347. See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 294, at 33. 
 348. This disclosure requirement would satisfy the concerns raised by Federal 
Reserve Chairman Bernanke regarding the risk management of broker-dealers that 
provide prime brokering services to hedge funds such as financing, trade execution, 
clearing and settlement services to hedge funds.  See Bernanke, supra note 235. 
 349. Christos Ioannidis & Giovanni Calice, An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of 
the Credit Default Swap Index Market on Large Complex Financial Institutions 
(Working Paper Series, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1447403. However, 
a detailed analysis of the impact of credit default swaps on the U.S. markets has yet to 
be written. 
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companies are at a minimum disturbing to our sense of fair and adequate 
disclosure. 
The inadequacy of the federal regulation to protect the investing 
public has, in part, led to the current historical disruption of the financial 
and securities markets.  Our federal financial disclosure policy350 is 
designed to provide investors with all material information to allow 
investors to make a reasonable investment choice.  The federal 
disclosure rules should be amended to require publicly-traded companies 
to provide a detailed description of the company’s hedge fund trading 
activity, risk exposure, potential impact on the company’s operations, 
and the identity of the hedge fund itself.  The information can be 
provided in the Management Discussion and Analysis with 
corresponding schedules and footnotes.  The disclosure should be 
comprehensive and analogous to disclosure requirements that are 
currently required for off-balance sheet transactions with which 
publicly-traded companies must provide pursuant to the Enron debacle. 
The fourth prong is for the SEC to share the hedge fund activity 
disclosure information that it receives from hedge funds and publicly-
traded companies with state securities regulators.  The SEC may 
coordinate monitoring and enforcement efforts with the North American 
Securities Administrators Association (NASAA).351 NASAA members 
which include every state securities regulatory agency in the country, 
such as the New York State Attorney General’s Office, the 
Massachusetts Securities Division, and the Colorado Division of 
Securities can be bring a great deal of expertise, resources and existing 
cooperative regulatory structure to the monitoring and enforcement 
efforts concerning questionable hedge fund activity. 
 350. See 17 C.F.R. § 2001.1 (2009). 
 351. North American Securities Administrators Association, About NASAA, 
http://www.nasaa.org/About_NASAA/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2009) (describing NASAA 
as “the oldest international organization devoted to investor protection”). 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
Out of every crisis, every tribulation, every disaster, 
 mankind rises with some share of greater knowledge, 
 of higher decency, of purer purpose . . . . 
 —Franklin Delano Roosevelt352 
Some commentators argue that American markets must remain 
competitive in a global financial economy.  But Congress must ask, “at 
what cost?”  How long should certain activities and participants in the 
financial and securities markets remain unregulated in order for the 
American markets to be competitive?  The answer cannot be that 
Congress will continue to allow private unregulated groups of investors 
to access financial and securities markets, conduct complex trades, 
borrow excessively from major banks, and yet refuse to disclose who 
they are, and what potential negative impact their transactions may have 
on the financial and securities markets and, more importantly, on the 
American investing public. 
The current financial collapse and economic struggle has proven 
that Congress cannot and should not deter from adopting legislation that 
can constrain the extravagance of certain hedge fund activity while 
simultaneously creating a regulatory balance that will not stifle 
innovation of new and creative financial products. The sustainability of 
the financial and securities markets, free of fraudulent or excessive 
hedge fund activity is imperative. The current absence of case law on 
this issue evidences that these are novel issues for the courts, Congress 
and the investing public.  As such, it is uncertain whether a bright-line 
regulatory rule should be established. The challenge for Congress will 
be to amend, where necessary, the Securities Act, the Securities 
Exchange Act, the Investment Company Act, or the Adviser Act and the 
rules promulgated thereunder to provide define and to clarify “hedge 
fund activity” and “hedge funds,” while simultaneously allowing such 
definitions to evolve with time, as new and innovative financial 
instruments are created in the hedge fund industry. 
As for Noreen Harrington, the brave whistleblower who came 
forward to tell an amazing story of how hedge funds were defrauding 
American mutual fund investors—ninety-five million American 
 352. Roosevelt Address, supra note 1. 
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investors owe Ms. Harrington a debt of gratitude.  However, as a result 
of her disclosure she lost her job and became subject of much media 
coverage. Nevertheless, because of her courage hundreds of investors 
impressed with her integrity and willingness to lose everything to protect 
the investing public have convinced Ms. Harrington that she should 
manage their investments.  As such, Noreen Harrington created her own 
investment fund. She operates it with integrity and transparency. Ms. 
Harrington’s investment fund’s governance matrix utilizes a best 
practices model. The model confirms that money can be made without 
defrauding the public or compromising the integrity of the American 
financial and securities markets, which in turn stabilizes the global 
economy. 
 
